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ABSTRACT 
The Protection of Children Involved in Prostitution (PCHIP) Act, which was passed in 
Alberta in 1999 and subject to immediate constitutional challenge, demonstrates the 
relationships between the fields of politics and law, and between youth criminal justice 
and child welfare legislation.  The Act allowed authorities to apprehend and detain a 
youth engaged, or at risk of becoming engaged in prostitution for five to forty-seven days 
in a protective safe house.  Though the PCHIP Act was passed as child welfare 
legislation, the punitive nature of the detainment led some to argue that the PCHIP Act 
was actually youth criminal justice legislation.  This blurry boundary between child 
welfare and youth justice has negative consequences for particular groups of youth.  In 
this case, Aboriginal female youth are disproportionately detained at protective safe 
houses.  This research applies concepts from Pierre Bourdieu and other theorists to 
critically analyze the PCHIP Act as a case study.  By drawing on various types of data, 
including the PCHIP Act, legislative debates, court transcripts, newspaper articles, 
government reports, and academic literature, two areas of inquiry are addressed.   The 
first issue is the relationships and boundaries between the fields of politics and law, and 
between child welfare and youth criminal justice legislation.  Secondly, this thesis 
attempts to explain why Aboriginal females are disproportionately confined by the 
PCHIP Act.  This research concludes that the fields of politics and law constantly interact 
with each other, and the boundaries between child welfare and youth criminal justice are 
vulnerable to the outcomes of these conflict-ridden exchanges.  These struggles, 
compounded by historical factors, have negative consequences for female Aboriginal 
youth in particular.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
My thesis investigates the relationships between the fields of politics and law, and 
between child welfare and youth criminal justice legislation.  The nature of these 
relationships becomes apparent through an exploration of the Protection of Children 
Involved in Prostitution (PCHIP) Act, which was passed as child welfare legislation by 
the Alberta legislature in 1999.  The Act allows police and social workers to apprehend 
and confine a youth involved, or suspected of being involved, in prostitution.  Youth are 
detained in a protective safe house, where they are provided with food, shelter, and 
educational programs.  A disproportionate number of Aboriginal female youth have been 
detained under the PCHIP Act (Koshan, 2003)1.   
 The legality of the Act was contested from the very beginning in the form of a 
constitutional challenge.  A debate emerged among academics, lawyers, judges, and 
politicians over whether the Act was child welfare legislation or criminal legislation.  The 
implications of this debate are significant, because criminal law comes under the 
jurisdiction of federal power.  If it were found that the PCHIP Act fell under the category 
of criminal law, it would be invalid because provinces do not have the power to legislate 
such law.   
 The debate over the true essence of the PCHIP Act underlines the shifting 
boundaries between the fields of youth criminal justice and child welfare: it is difficult to 
state exactly where one field ends and the other begins.  Furthermore, the ensuing 
juridico-political conflicts that aimed to provide a solution to the problems raised by the 
Act points to an even larger issue: the relationship between law and politics.   
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It is important to note that the PCHIP Act was amended on October 1, 2007.  The 
amendments were preceded by a news release on March 12, 2007, which stated that MLA 
Heather Forsyth had proposed changes to the Act (Government of Alberta News Release, 
March 12, 2007).  One such amendment was changing the name of the Act to the 
Protection of Sexually Exploited Children Act (PSECA)2.  Also, the amendments include 
an appeal process, which was lacking in the PCHIP Act.  The maximum confinement 
period remains unchanged under the PSECA. 
This thesis was motivated by my experiences in Edmonton, Alberta as a staff 
member at the Yellowhead Youth Centre (YYC) secure care cottages from 2004 to 2005.  
Youth who were viewed to be ‘a danger to themselves or others’ in order to be confined 
in secure care, which turned out to be quite a vague condition.  The cottages were locked, 
and I got the impression that the difference between the confinement at the secure care 
cottages and actual jail was probably small.  During my employment, the number of 
youth being confined under secure care began to dwindle, and then YYC was given the 
PCHIP contract.  One of the cottages was designated as a protective safe house for youth 
confined under the PCHIP Act.   
Staff at the secure care cottage was warned that these new PCHIP kids were going 
to be really rough and violent.  We were given special supplies to deal with these 
dangerous youth.  For instance, we were given special gloves which were impenetrable to 
knives, to protect the staff from stabbing.  As the youth started to be brought in, we 
realized that they were the same youth we saw over at the secure care cottage.  So it was 
the same youth being confined, only they were now being confined under a different 
legislation.  
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After YYC was given this contract for the PCHIP youth, I became interested in 
knowing exactly why these kids were being confined, and what this legislation looked 
like.  From a staff viewpoint, the major task was to keep the youth in line- to make sure 
they got up on time, ate on time, did their chores, and stuck to the schedule, and to punish 
accordingly if there were deviations from acceptable behaviour.  When I looked into the 
actual legislation, a discrepancy became apparent between rhetoric and reality.  On paper, 
the PCHIP Act was about protecting vulnerable youth.  However, in reality, we were 
simply locking up these youth.   
I detected a preoccupation with race during my employment at the protective safe 
house.  Staff was required to keep statistics on the race of each youth.  Whenever a new 
girl was brought in to the safe house, we checked off the racial origin of the youth from a 
list of possible races.  It was unknown, to me at least, why this information was 
important, who was interested in this information, or how this information was to be 
used.  This issue, along with the discrepancy discussed above, led to the research 
questions addressed in the thesis.  I do not claim that my observations of the protective 
safe house, the youth who were detained there, or the staff who worked there are 
conclusive or irrefutable.  However, I will include these observations throughout the 
thesis where relevant.    
 
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The effect of politics on law, and conversely, the effect of law on politics are addressed in 
this thesis.  I take the term ‘politics’ to include individual legislators and politicians, who 
bring their own power and interests into interactions with other actors in various fields.  
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The term also has a wider, more structural meaning, in the form of political parties or 
governments.  Powerful political parties draw on ideological interests to dictate how 
populations are governed.  By the term ‘law,’ I mean the institution of courts, and the 
hierarchies contained within these courts, as well as categories of law including child 
welfare law and youth criminal justice law.  I contend that the dynamic relationship 
between the social fields of law and politics affects interactions within the fields 
themselves.  In the legal field, political matters incite boundary struggles between child 
welfare and youth criminal justice legislation. 
 My first research question is: What is the nature of the relationship between law 
and politics, and between child welfare and youth criminal justice legislation?  I utilize 
the PCHIP Act as a case study to investigate these relationships.  Moreover, the boundary 
disputes outlined above have consequences for the types of youth impacted by the Act.  
In the case of the PCHIP Act, Aboriginal females have been detained at a 
disproportionate rate.  This concern leads to my second research question, which asks:  
Why are Aboriginal female youth confined by the Act much more than other groups of 
youth?  To address this very complicated query, I investigate historical factors, as well as 
features of the PCHIP Act itself which have resulted in unequal treatment against this 
group.   
 These research questions are addressed primarily through an application of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework of ‘field’ and ‘habitus.’  Bourdieu’s concepts are 
complemented by several other theorists, including Michel Foucault and Mariana 
Valverde.  Their theoretical insights are applied to various sources of primary and 
secondary data, including textual sources, ‘written reasons’ provided by judges, 
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legislative debates, government documents, and a ‘Notice of Confinement’ document.  
By utilizing Bourdieu’s methodological and theoretical approach, I aim to develop an 
analytical and critical understanding of the PCHIP Act, and of the relationship between 
politics and law. 
 
1.2 THEORETICAL CONTEXTUALIZATION 
The PHCIP Act is an example of legal intervention mandated by the state.  This type of 
intervention emerged as part of the welfare state in Post-World-War-Two Canada.  
Interventionist law can be located within a debate between two opposing streams of 
thought within the sociology of law.  The law is characterized either as being voluntas 
regin (the law is affected by politics), or as directed by its own ratio (law is shaped only 
by its internal rationality) (Zamboni, 2006).  Stated differently, it is either "law is 
politics" or "either law or politics" (Zamboni 2006: 03).   
 'Legal Liberalism' or 'legal positivism' represents the latter view; law is 
autonomous from politics.  According to this view, law is formal, neutral, and 
dispassionate.  The formal nature of the law is based on the premise that the existing 
body of law is consistent and complete.  The answer to any legal matter can be answered 
simply by locating the appropriate rule.  Since we all abide by the same body of law, 
legal outcomes are logical, consistent, and just.  The neutrality of the law rests on the use 
of neutral language, and the assumption that laws are not based on any particular moral 
viewpoint.  Legal Liberalism propounds a distinct boundary between law and other fields.  
Thus, legal matters and reasoning are seen as separate from political or ethical objectives.  
This positivist orientation denies any connection between historical events and 
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subsequent legislation (Bakan et al. 2003: 56). The concept of the rule of law is the most 
basic tenet of this viewpoint, which assumes that a single set of laws should be applied 
equally to all citizens, and that the judiciary is independent from the executive branch of 
government (Waddams: 1992).   
 Legal Liberalism/positivism remains the dominant viewpoint in the practice of 
law today (Aylward: 1999; Cotterrell: 1984).  For example, American sociologist Donald 
Black uses a positivist methodology in his research on law, by observing and measuring 
correlations between the 'behaviour of law' and other social phenomena (Cotterrell, 1984: 
14).  Another example of positivist legal theory comes from Hans Kelsen (1970), who 
argues that law and politics are two autonomous phenomena (Zamboni, 2006)3.   
 Legal Liberalism is aligned with Weber's conception of 'positivist law' or 'formal 
justice.'  According to Weber, positivist law is based on four premises.  First, every legal 
decision consists in the application of an abstract rule of law to a concrete situation.  
Second, the process of making a legal decision is dictated by 'legal logic.'  Third, there 
are no gaps in the rules of positivist law, and finally, every social action can be 
categorized as obeying law, violating law, or applying the rule of law (Rheinstein, 1966).  
Nevertheless, Weber provided an early critique to positivist law in Economy and Society 
(1925).  He points out an "insoluble conflict between the formal and substantive 
principles of justice" (1925: 893)4.  Though the abstract nature of formal justice allows 
individuals to manipulate the legal system like a "technically rational machine" (thereby 
increasing human freedom), the abstract nature functions to impinge on substantive 
justice (thereby decreasing human freedom) (1925: 811 and 813).  He states, "Formal 
justice and the ‘freedom’ which it guarantees are indeed rejected by all groups 
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ideologically interested in substantive justice" (1925: 813).  Only substantive rationality 
privileges ethical action and conformity to a moral good, which allows those who possess 
it to comprehensively rationalize reality (Kalberg, 1980).  The intrusion on substantive 
justice leads to a situation of substantive irrationality, which amounts to the suppression 
of individual values and needs (Feldman, 1991: 230).   
 The interests of specific groups regarding formal justice differ according to their 
relative economic power, according to Weber.  He states:   
 Formal justice guarantees the maximum freedom for the interested parties to 
 represent their formal legal interests.  But because of the unequal distribution of 
 economic power, which the system of formal justice legalizes, this very freedom 
 must time and again produce consequences which are contrary to the substantive 
 postulates of religious ethics or of political expediency (1925: 812) 
 
Thus, economic power and law are linked5.  Law has a "strong influence" on economics, 
and conversely, "economic interests are among the strongest factors in the creation of 
law" (Weber, 1925: 665 and 334).   
 Weber’s critique on positivist law shaped the legal realist movement, which 
emerged in the first half of the twentieth century6.  For example, proponents of legal 
realism such as Karl Llewellyn (1962) and Arthur Corbin (1952) have argued that the 
legal and political fields have boundaries that cross and overlap 'to some extent,' causing 
a "partial rigidity of the law" (Zamboni, 2006: 310).  Realists attempted to break out of 
the dichotomy of either 'law is politics' or 'law or politics,' by incorporating aspect of both 
sides of the debate.  Zamboni (2006) contends, for example, that law is simultaneously 
pulled toward and away from the field of politics within the context of the welfare state.  
Realists perceive the law as "neither totally outside of nor completely embedded into the 
political mass, but as intersecting the political world" (Zamboni, 2006: 298).  However, 
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concurrent to the decline of the welfare state, the law as is increasingly becoming a tool 
for politicians.  Instances of judicial activism evidence this, particularly when judges 
attempt to 'stretch' the law to implement values which political actors sense are lacking 
among the public.  Ferejohn (2002) has noted this trend, arguing that the field of politics 
has been ‘judicialized’ since World War II in the United States.   
 In the late 1970s, a group of radical legal scholars began to attack the assumptions 
of Legal Liberalism, giving rise to Critical Legal Studies (CLS) (Aylward, 1999).  
Claiming roots in legal realism, this group challenged various tenets of Legal Liberalism, 
including the rule of law, formalism, and neutrality.  For example, Cotterrell maintains 
that positivist law ignores the role of values as a component of law, and argues that law is 
both “fact and value” (1984: 11 and 15).  CLS theorists contend that the rule of law is 
used by the powerful to oppress less powerful members of society, maintaining the status 
quo.  They contended that the rule of law is impossible; a mere myth.  The CLS 
movement also rejects the assumption that law is separate from politics or ethics.  They 
argue that powerful members in society, such as judges, can and do impose their political 
and moral objectives on the rest of society (MacDonald, 2002: 25).  Before the passing of 
the Charter in 1982, CLS proponents critiqued the failure of the state to guarantee rights 
other than individual rights, and argued for the elimination of rights altogether 
(MacDonald, 2002: 31).  This was a highly contentious argument, which would 
ultimately alienate groups (such as feminist or minority organizations) which otherwise 
had much in common with CLS.  Some have argued that CLS is plagued by the same 
‘white privilege’ it claims to critique (MacDonald, 2002: 32).    
 9
 Along with CLS, feminist jurisprudence emerged in the 1970s, joining in the 
critique of legal liberalism (Haney, 2000).  Though differences exist within feminist 
jurisprudence (for example, there are competing accounts of the legal system’s 
representation of gender), feminist jurisprudence is based on a common premise:  
 (W)omen are systemically and systematically oppressed in the patriarchal order, 
 and […] this oppression carries over to the formulation of law, the interpretation 
 of law, and the ways in which women come to use (or not use) the legal system 
 (MacDonald, 2002: 32). 
 
Haney (2000) has suggested that the concept of ‘loosely coupled systems’ captures the 
current status of the state.  She states, “in the last decade, tighter links seem to be forming 
among state apparatuses; transformations in one state appear to feed off of and inform 
changes in other spheres” (Haney, 2000: 660).  In particular, links between the criminal 
justice and welfare systems have supported this position.  This orientation has been 
adopted by McCorkel (2004), who investigated patterns of influence and coordination 
between welfare and criminal justice in the American context7. 
 Critical Race Theory (CRT) emerged out of CLS in the mid 1980s as scholars of 
colour challenged some of the assumptions of CLS (MacDonald, 2002: 36).  While these 
scholars shared the CLS scepticism about law's neutrality, they argued that CLS largely 
ignored the realities of people of colour (Aylward, 1999: 26).  Thus, they felt alienated 
from CLS discourse.  CRT recognizes that law is both a product of, and promoter of 
racism.  However, CRT does not dismiss the possibility using law as a tool for social 
change.  CRT theorists also critiqued CLS for being too idealistic and unnecessarily 
pessimistic about the value of law, especially regarding rights.   
 Critical Race Feminism (CRF) is the most recent development in the CLS 
trajectory.  Critical Race Feminist theorists recognize both CLS and CRT as sources of 
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the CRF movement (Aylward, 1999).  This movement broke off from mainstream 
feminism, arguing that feminism has overlooked the experiences of women of colour.  
CRF emphasizes the ‘intersectionality’ of race and gender in oppression, not simply one 
or the other8.  Some mainstream feminist concepts, such as the conception of the family 
unit as patriarchal and oppressive, were insulting to Black feminists, as the family was 
seen by many Black women as a refuge from racism in the rest of society (MacDonald, 
2002: 38).   
 Legal realism, feminist jurisprudence, CLS, CRT, and CRF have all proposed that 
a relationship exists between politics and law, but differ in the degree or nature of 
influence afforded to the former over the latter.  Bourdieu has contributed to this debate, 
as shown by recent research within these camps which utilize his orientation9.  Bourdieu 
has re-conceptualized the original debate (‘law is politics’ versus ‘law or politics’) by 
identifying two antagonistic ideologies in theories of law.  The instrumentalist position 
views law as a direct reflection of existing power relationships, as dictated by dominant 
groups (parallel to the ‘law is politics’ position).  In contrast, the formalist viewpoint 
conceives of the law as an autonomous, independent, closed system; unaffected by other 
fields (comparable to the ‘law or politics’ position) (Bourdieu, 1987a).  Similar to the 
legal realists, Bourdieu seeks to find a middle ground between these two extremes.  He 
contends that both positions ignore the existence of a social universe which he calls the 
juridical field.  To understand the 'social significance of the law,' we must analyze law 
within the context of the juridical field, which is "relatively independent of external 
determinations and pressures" (Bourdieu, 1987a: 816, emphasis added).    
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Similarities have been pointed out between Bourdieu’s orientation regarding 
boundaries and the position taken by Niklas Luhmann10.  According to Valverde, both 
theorists provide an answer to the same question: the question of the boundaries of law 
(2006: 591)11.  Luhmann argues that the law possesses “greater or lesser degrees of 
autonomy or closure in relation to the extra-legal world” by suggesting that the law’s 
unique system of communication constitutes its autonomy (van Krieken, 2004: 4).  He 
contends that law should be viewed as an “autopoietic or self-reproducing system of 
meaning and communication rather than as a set of institutional forms, structures or 
practices” (2004: 4, italics original).  The law is self-referencing in that  
(e)verything the legal system appears to be made up of – existing legal doctrine, 
particular patterns of professional training, a certain structure to the institutional  
framework of law – is in reality created by the legal system itself, and not by 
anything outside the legal system (2004: 5).   
 
Van Kreiken adds that the autopoietic nature of the law is analogous to a “building which 
makes its own bricks” (2004: 5).  The circularity inherent in autopoietic systems 
“produce regularities that regulate themselves” (Teubner, 1989: 736).   
 Like Bourdieu, Luhmann conceives of the social world as composed of 
innumerable systems, although Bourdieu would refer to these systems as fields12.  
Despite this similarity, the two theorists disagree over the level of autonomy afforded to 
these fields/systems.  For instance, Bourdieu argues that no field can be properly 
analyzed without accounting for the influence of economic and/or political power over 
that field.  Luhmann, in contrast, sees the juridical and political systems as autonomous 
from each other13.  According to van Krieken, Luhmann argues that “the system of 
politics and economics might be seen as being autonomous from law as law is from 
them” (van Krieken, 2004: 5-6).  Though Luhmann holds that the legal system is also 
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“cognitively open,” this openness is never overpowered by its “normative closure” (van 
Krieken, 2004: 9).  The problem created from this conception arises when 
interconnectedness between epistemes becomes obvious.  Luhmann’s theory does not 
easily allow one to account for communication across epistemes.   
 The case of the PCHIP Act demonstrates an instance where politics and 
government had much influence over the legal field, which demonstrates interaction 
across field (or episteme) boundaries.  The very drafting of such legislation, along with 
the events surrounding the constitutional challenge, reveal that the boundary between the 
legal and political fields was anything but ‘closed.’  Bourdieu’s approach, which views 
the law as possessing some degree of autonomy from external fields, but at the same time 
very much structured according to power relations emanating from the field of power, is 
clearly more suitable for the current research.     
 Another important difference between Luhmann and Bourdieu are their accounts 
of action within the field/system.  Luhmann characterizes systems as internally cohesive.  
The legal system “observes itself not as a system […] but as a collection of texts referring 
to each other” (Luhmann, 1995: 287).  This arrangement results in a cohesive and 
consistent (if redundant) legal system, based on an emphasis on stare decisis, or 
precedent.  Bourdieu, in contrast, views the legal field as a site of constant struggle rather 
than stable cohesiveness.  He states, “The field is the locus of relations of force-and not 
only of meaning-and of struggles aimed at transforming it, and therefore of endless 
change” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 103).  Even if fields appear to be coherent from 
the outside, this stability itself is the product of conflict and competition (1992: 103-4).   
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 This is a crucial difference between Luhmann’s and Bourdieu’s perspectives with 
consideration of the present research.  The debates over the initial drafting of the PCHIP 
Act, along with the conflict acted out in courtroom and political settings over the 
constitutionality issue, require a theoretical perspective which can account for 
competition and struggle within and across field boundaries.  Since Bourdieu’s theory 
can account for these struggles, while Luhmann’s cannot, the former is a better choice for 
the analysis of the PCHIP Act.   
 
1.3 CHAPTER SUMMARIES AND DATA SELECTION 
In the next chapter, the theoretical and methodological orientation utilized in this thesis is 
outlined.  Concepts coming from Pierre Bourdieu are of primary importance, including 
‘field,’ ‘habitus,’ and ‘capital.’  These concepts are supplemented by ideas of Michel 
Foucault, David Garland, and Marianna Valverde.  The operationalization of these 
concepts is explained.  
Chapter three engages in a historical analysis of the fields of child welfare and 
youth justice, spanning England and Canada.  Responses which predate the PCHIP Act 
are addressed and contextualized, framed by Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts of field and 
habitus.  The fields of child welfare and youth criminal justice are described, in 
particular, how they emerged and developed, along with an account of the habitus within 
these fields over different time periods.  For this analysis, various textual sources which 
document the history of these fields in Canada and England are drawn upon. 
 Chapter four engages in the debate over the value of the PCHIP Act.  On one side 
of the debate, Alberta government reports, newspaper articles, and one academic article 
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argue (or assume) that the PCHIP Act is beneficial to the youth who become confined 
under it.  This position is countered by a relatively small group of academics who 
contend that the PCHIP Act merely criminalizes youth who are already marginalized.  
Further, the latter group raises suspicions over the overrepresentation of Aboriginal girls 
in protective safe houses, a topic which is not seriously addressed by the former group.  
The chapter ends with a critical examination of the PCHIP Act both as an isolated 
document, as well as within the context of other legislation relevant to the problem of 
youth prostitution.  Through this analysis, the practical reality of the PCHIP Act becomes 
apparent, which contributes to the initial debate.    
Chapter five is composed of a field analysis of the relationship between law and 
politics, and between child welfare and youth criminal justice legislation.  In this 
analysis, positions in the fields of child welfare, youth criminal justice, and politics are 
identified, and the relationships been these positions are explored.  The constitutional 
challenge provides the occasion to examine these relationships between and within fields.  
In this chapter, the first research question is addressed, which asks what the relationship 
is between the fields of politics and law, and how the PCHIP Act fit into this relationship 
between fields.  To investigate this question, data such as legal documents and written 
reasons pertaining to the challenge are used which demonstrate the political posturing 
which occurred in response to legal manoeuvres.   
Chapter six explores the second research question, which asks why particular 
types of youth (Aboriginal females) are regularly confined by the Act, while other youth 
are not considered appropriate candidates for detainment.  Bourdieu's concept of habitus 
is used to frame this discussion, as well as several of Valverde's insights, especially 
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pertaining to the regulation of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.  Several sources of textual 
data, such as a 'Notice of Child' document, and the PCHIP Act itself are utilized.   
 In chapter seven, the thesis is concluded by reviewing the findings, and by placing 
these findings within the larger neo-liberal context.  Implications of the passing of the 
PCHIP Act are stated, and several recommendations are put forth with regard to policy 
pertaining to youth prostitution.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORECTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL 
ORIENTATION 
To reach my objective to develop an analytical perspective through which to view the 
PCHIP Act, a discussion of theoretical and methodological orientations is necessary.  
This orientation is informed primarily by Bourdieu, in particular, concepts such as field, 
habitus, capital, and symbolic violence, as they pertain to the fields of politics and law.  
These concepts have been utilized and/or critiqued by other researchers, who have 
enriched or modified them.  I attempt to synthesize various aspects of Foucault’s and 
Bourdieu’s theories, with the aim of laying a foundation for the analysis contained in 
remaining chapters.   
 The methodology employed in the research for this thesis consists of the 
application of theoretical concepts to a particular case study, in this case the PCHIP Act.  
I discuss the operationalization of these theoretical concepts at the end of the chapter by 
providing a diagram which clarifies the expected relationships between the fields of 
interest here.   
 
2.1 MUTUAL POSSESSION  
Bourdieu has described the link between two of his key concepts – field and habitus –as a 
relationship of mutual possession, as they function only in relation to each other 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 20).  Through field and habitus, Bourdieu attempts to 
characterize human social practice without falling into dichotomies he considers false, 
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such as subject/object, freedom/determinism and individual/structure.  Field and habitus 
allow for a conception of human activity which accounts for both its stable nature, yet 
also the constant potential of spontaneous action.  
Bourdieu conceives of social fields as a “plurality of worlds” (1990b: 21).  The 
social world is composed of semi-autonomous fields, all with their own logics, and all 
generating among actors a belief of what is at stake in the field, reflecting a shared ‘doxa’ 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98).  The logic of the juridical field is characterized by a 
particular juridical language, which absorbs elements which are foreign to it by rendering 
them impersonal and neutral (Bourdieu, 1987a: 819).  This logic has two effects, 
according to Bourdieu.  First, the “neutralization effect” is created by the law’s usage of 
“passive and impersonal constructions.”  Second, the “universalization effect” is 
accomplished through the use of  
constative verbs in the present and past third person singular, emphasizing 
 expression of the factual […] the use of indefinites and of the intemporal present 
 […] designed to express the generality or omnitemporality of the rule of law […] 
 and the recourse to fixed formulas and locutions, which give little room for any 
 individual variation (Bourdieu, 1987a: 820).   
 
According to Bourdieu, the boundaries of fields are imprecise, shifting, and 
permeable14.  Boundaries between fields are the subject of dispute and struggle between 
agents in the fields.  In consideration of the fields of politics and law, agents include an 
assortment of political figures, lawyers and judges which can be seen as situated in both 
fields (Ferejohn, 2002).  Fields are defined by the stakes which are at risk.  For example, 
in the juridical field, the ultimate stake is control of the right to determine law (Bourdieu, 
1987a: 816). Whoever ‘wins’ this right also gains the right to control the interpretation of 
legal texts (1987a: 818).  Legal professionals are constantly struggling with those outside 
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the legal field in an attempt to coerce acceptance for their conception of law’s relation to 
the rest of the social world (Terdiman, 1987: 809).  For Bourdieu, the task of the social 
scientist is to “describe a state (long-lasting or temporary) of these struggles and 
therefore of the frontier delimiting the territory held by the competing agents” (Bourdieu, 
1983: 324).   
To Bourdieu (1987a), the law must be conceived as a juridical field which is 
relatively autonomous from other fields15.  This autonomy is based on a number of 
features of the juridical field: 
The very fact that legal judgment arises from careful consideration of a closed 
body of doctrine and rules does establish a real independence from the everyday 
normative assessment of justice and fairness, and the function of mobilising legal 
rules in relation to particular concrete situations…inherently gives enormous 
discretion to the juridical field (judges) as to how those rules are to be mobilized 
(properly questionable only by other lawyers), which is also in turn a basis for 
autonomy (van Krieken, 2004: 15).   
 
The discretion afforded to judges has a paradoxical effect: the discretion needs to be 
disguised in order to maintain that the law is autonomous.  The inherent arbitrariness of 
their discretion is made invisible, leading to the belief that the law is neutral; immune to 
the effects of other fields (Van Krieken, 2004: 15). 
According to Bourdieu’s theory, the field of power is the most important out of all 
fields, as the hierarchy of power relationships structures all the other fields.  Actors who 
possess power are able to transfer this power into other social fields – for instance, a 
businessman or a lawyer can convert professional prestige into other institutional 
domains.  In contrast, actors who do not possess power are less successful in transferring 
power from one field to another.  For instance, highly regarded artists cannot readily 
convert their prestige in the field of art to other fields (Calhoun et al., 2002: 264).   
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Each field draws on a particular ‘habitus,’ defined broadly as a “system of 
dispositions” and a “generative principle of responses more or less adapted to the 
demands of a certain field” (Bourdieu, 1990b: 77 and 91)16.  Krais characterizes habitus 
as: 
(A)n ensemble of schemata of perception, thinking, feeling, evaluating, speaking, 
and acting that structures all the expressive, verbal, and practical manifestations 
and utterances of a person (1993: 169). 
 
The effect of the habitus is that agents who are equipped with it will behave in a certain 
way in certain circumstances.  However, the habitus does not dictate all action, as though 
all action followed strict rules or laws.  To achieve success, actors must be able to 
improvise action depending on the struggles in the field.   
 Legal habitus, reflecting “deep structures of legal perception, judgment and 
behaviour” is characterized by “social, economic, psychological and linguistic practices” 
(van Krieken, 2004: 15).  The presence of this habitus causes predictability in court 
decisions, as judges refer to and share a common set of ideas about legal versus illegal 
behaviour.   The cohesiveness of the habitus strengthens, and is strengthened by, the 
hierarchy within the juridical field.  Though this hierarchy causes and is caused by 
constant competition, this competition is complementary as well as hostile (Bourdieu, 
1987a: 820-23).   
 Entry into the juridical field is conditional on the possession of the proper habitus.  
According to Bourdieu, requirements for an ‘entry ticket’ into the legal field include a 
“minimal mastery” of legal texts and “modes of thinking,” which result in the production 
of a “specific form of judgement” based on a body of rules (1987a: 820).  Linguistic 
competence is also a necessary pre-requisite.  Even if one is in the middle of legal 
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proceedings, one cannot participate effectively without possessing this (1987a: 828).  The 
possession or lack of such linguistic competence is absolutely essential to the power 
differences between those who can participate and those who cannot.    
 History is the foundation of habitus.  Bourdieu states: “The habitus – embodied 
history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history – is the active presence 
of the whole past of which it is the product (1990a: 56).  The encounter between habitus 
and field is also an encounter between ‘objectified’ and ‘incorporated’ history; field 
representing the former and habitus the latter (1990a: 66).  The importance of history in 
the development of field and habitus relates to Bourdieu’s imperative to include historical 
analysis in sociological research.  He refers to the division between history and sociology 
as “disastrous” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 90).  Thus, the law should be considered 
a part of history; not above or outside of history.   
 It is helpful to draw upon Bourdieu’s ‘game’ analogy to clarify what is meant by 
the “almost miraculous encounter” between field and habitus (Bourdieu, 1990a: 66).  In a 
game, a set of people take part in an activity which has rules.  Though people do not 
always follow the rules exactly, the activity generally follows certain regularities.  The 
most successful players demonstrate a ‘feel for the game.’  These players, at every 
moment, do whatever action the game requires.  This assumes a pre-existing capacity for 
invention and adaptation.  Successful players do not mechanically obey the rules of the 
game; this would hamper their ability to adapt to an infinite number of circumstances or 
possibilities.  However, this freedom to improvise is constrained by the limits of the 
game.  As Bourdieu states, “in a game you can’t do just anything and get away with it” 
(1990b: 64).   
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 Thus, social action is free in the sense that actors can employ a multitude of 
‘moves’ to ‘play the game,’ yet action is at the same time constrained by the field.  
Bourdieu states,  
 “Nothing is simultaneously freer and more constrained than the action of the good 
 player […] The habitus, as society written into the body, into the biological 
 individual, enables the infinite number of acts of the game – written into the game 
 as possibilities and objective demands – to be produced; the constraints and 
 demands of the game, although they are not restricted to a code of rules, impose 
 themselves on those people – and those people alone – who, because they have a 
 feel for the game, a feel, that is, for the immanent necessity of the game, are 
 prepared to perceive them and carry them out” (Bourdieu, 1990b: 63).    
 
 The most successful people in a given field demonstrate their ‘feel for the game’ 
by utilizing various forms of capital to gain power.  Though their actions appear to be 
rational, they are not based on reason (1990b: 11).  The actions demonstrate 
“intentionality without intention” or “cognition without consciousness” (1990b: 11-12).  
Bourdieu points out that behaviour can be directed toward certain ends without actors 
being conscious of these ends.  The notion of habitus is used to account for this paradox 
(1990b: 9-10).  He states,  
 [M]y whole effort aims at explaining, via the notion of habitus for instance, how it 
 is that behaviour (economic or other) takes the form of sequences that are 
 objectively guided toward a certain end, without necessarily being the product 
 either of a conscious strategy or of a mechanical determination.  Agents to some 
 extent fall into the practice that is theirs rather than freely choosing it or being 
 impelled into it by mechanical constraints.  If this is how it is, it’s because the 
 habitus, a system of predispositions acquired through a relationship to a certain 
 field, becomes effective and operative when it encounters the conditions of its 
 effectiveness (Bourdieu, 1990b: 90).   
 
 ‘Game playing’ in social fields inevitably involves the shifting of power relations 
as actors attempt to gain power and prestige.  Some actors, endowed with a better ‘feel 
for the game’ than others, accumulate power.  Power tends to accumulate in certain 
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fields, in the fields of politics and law for instance.  This power allows certain actors, or 
groups of actors, to continuously dis-empower already disadvantaged groups.   
 
2.2 RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN FIELDS 
Actors in the field compete by employing various types of capital, defined by Bourdieu 
as:   
 (A)ccumulated labor (in its materialized form or its ‘incorporated,’ embodied, 
 form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or 
 groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified 
 or living labor (Bourdieu, 1986: 241). 
 
Economic, cultural, and social capital are the “three fundamental species” of capital, but 
subtypes exist under each (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 119, italics original)17.   
To Bourdieu, economic capital is dominant over the other types (Bourdieu, 1990b: 93)18.  
Within the juridical field, capital is based on the possession of technical competence to 
properly analyze and interpret a corpus of texts (Bourdieu, 1987a: 817).  Educational 
capital is stressed, as this allows one to obtain professional qualifications.  The strengths 
of different types of capital are largely determined by the position of the legal field vis-à-
vis the field of politics.  Individuals in the field can act in ways to increase their capital.  
They can attempt to change the relative value of their dominant capital, or try to discredit 
capital held by others (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 99).   
 Each type of capital can be transformed by symbolic capital, which is:  
(T)he form that one or another of these species takes when it is grasped through 
categories of perception that recognize its specific logic, or, if you prefer, 
misrecognize the arbitrariness of its possessions and accumulation (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 119).   
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By imposing categories of perception onto the viewer, the “act of observing and 
recognizing symbolic capital transforms the latter into economic or cultural capital” 
(Cicourel, 1993: 101).  This process reproduces and reinforces “power structures which 
define the organization of social space” (Cicourel, 1993: 101). 
 Positions in the field form relationships of domination, subordination or 
equivalence to each other according to the access they afford to the types of capital which 
are at stake in the field (Jenkins, 1992: 85).  The hierarchy of different types of capital 
varies according to field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98).  Thus, the ‘trump cards’ in 
one field may be ineffective in another field.  This nature of capital rests on the very 
dependence of capital on field.  As Bourdieu and Wacquant state,  
(T)he value of a species of capital […] hinges on the existence of a game, of a 
field in which this competency can be employed; a species of capital is what is 
efficacious in a given field, both as a weapon and as a stake of struggle, that 
which allows its possessors to wield a power, an influence, and thus to exist 
(1992: 98, italics original). 
 
With regard to the hierarchy of capital in the legal field, Calhoun et al. point out that 
participants who differ in field position (for example, a small town lawyer versus a 
Supreme Court Justice) employ different strategies to gain capital (2002: 262). 
Hierarchies exist among judges, among lawyers, and between judges and lawyers.  
Schisms also exist between theorists and practitioners of law (Bourdieu, 1987a: 821).  
This complex division of labour (established without conscious planning) results from 
many contentious instances of position-taking (Bourdieu, 1987a: 817-18, Calhoun et al. 
2002: 262).   
The positions of actors in the legal field parallel the clients these actors serve.  
Legal actors with relatively less power tend to represent people who are disempowered, 
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while powerful actors tend to represent powerful clients (Bourdieu, 1987a: 827).  He 
states: 
 Those who occupy inferior positions in the field (as for example in social welfare 
 law) tend to work with a clientele composed of social inferiors who thereby 
 increase the inferiority of these positions.  Thus, their subversive efforts have less 
 chance of overturning the power relations within the field than they do of 
 contributing to the adaptation of the juridical corpus and, thereby, to the 
 perpetuation of the structure of the field itself (1987a: 850). 
 
The consequence of this representation is that choices made in the legal realm are 
unlikely to disadvantage dominant forces.  The interests of dominant legal actors are 
generally shared by dominant political or economic actors (Bourdieu, 1987a: 842). 
 Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence refers to the injustice that arises when 
one powerful group exercises their power to ‘name’ or ‘label’ another group19.  A key 
feature of symbolic violence is that it is not seen as violence.  Symbolic violence is 
censored, euphemized, and misrecognized violence (Bourdieu, 1990a: 126).  Though 
force is fully exercised, symbolic violence is not seen as a force.  The law can legitimize 
disguised force, gaining approval and acceptance, by appealing to reason or morality 
(1990b: 85).  Gender domination is, to Bourdieu, the “paradigmatic form of symbolic 
violence” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 170).  This type of domination is so deeply 
imbedded that it needs virtually no justification.  The ‘male order’ appears to be self-
evident and universal, taken for granted (1992: 171).  
According to Bourdieu, symbolic violence occurs when powerful actors 
collectively decide that overt violence is unacceptable in a particular case.  The choice to 
use symbolic violence also depends on the state of the power relations between the two 
groups, and the ethicality of the group who has more power (Bourdieu, 1990a: 127).  He 
states:  
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So long as overt violence […] is collectively disapproved of and is liable to 
provoke either a violent riposte or the flight of the victim – that is, in both cases, 
for lack of any legal recourse, the destruction of the very relationship that was to 
be exploited – symbolic violence, gentle, invisible violence, unrecognized as 
such, chosen as much as undergone, […] presents itself as the most economical 
mode of domination because it best corresponds to the economy of the system 
(Bourdieu, 1990a: 127). 
 
Thus, the harder it is to exercise direct domination, and the more that people disapprove 
of this type of power, the more likely that gentle, symbolic domination will be used 
(Bourdieu, 1990a: 128). 
Bourdieu recognizes law as the “realization par excellence” of symbolic violence 
(1990b: 84), stating that “law is the quintessential form of symbolic power of naming that 
creates the things names, and creates social groups in particular” (1987a: 838).  Creating 
law through legislation involves a codification of actions which were previously 
governed by the “practical sense of the habitus” (Cronin, 1996: 68). Codification  
goes hand in glove with discipline and with the normalization of practices […] 
Codification minimizes ambiguity and vagueness, in particular in interactions […] 
when different systems of dispositions are involved, there appears the possibility 
of an accident, a collision or a conflict…Codification is of capital importance 
because it ensures a basic level of communication (Bourdieu, 1990b: 80). 
 
Codification is a process of rationalization which “gives rise to new forms of symbolic 
power” (Cronin, 1996: 68).   
 Symbolic violence allows powerful actors to impose their conceptualizations onto 
other actors with less power.  These relatively powerless actors have little choice but to 
accept them (Terdiman, 1987: 812).  For example, decisions made by judges create truth 
about the people involved.  The legal clients have no choice but to accept the judge’s 
decision.  Although they may be able to appeal, they eventually will have to concede to a 
judgment, as it is against the law to do otherwise (Bourdieu, 1987a: 838).  According to 
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Bourdieu, this form of authorized speech coming from judges is “performative,” as things 
are created by the very act of naming them (Bourdieu, 1987a: 838).  The ability of the 
court to create simply by naming is based on the power the legal realm possesses.   
 An important feature of symbolic violence is that those who are dominated by it 
are complicit in their domination.  Bourdieu argues that the success of symbolic acts of 
naming depend on the degree to which those who are ‘named’ share the opinion of those 
who have the power to name (Bourdieu, 1987a: 839).  If those who are ‘named’ in the 
process of symbolic violence are not complicit, the ‘naming’ will not be successful.  The 
source of this unconscious complicity is that symbolic violence can only effectively name 
what is already developing.  Bourdieu states: 
(T)he will to transform the world by transforming the words for naming it, by 
producing new categories of perception and judgment, and by dictating a new 
vision of social divisions and distributions, can only succeed if the resulting 
prophesies, or creative evocations, are also, at least in part, well-founded pre-
visions, anticipatory descriptions.  These visions only call forth what they 
proclaim – whether new practices, new mores or especially new social groupings 
– because they announce what is in the process of developing.  They are not so 
much the midwives as the recording secretaries of history (Bourdieu, 1987a: 839-
40). 
 
The law can only remain effective as long as the inherent arbitrariness remains 
unrecognized.  The public must believe in the neutrality and autonomy of the law for 
symbolic violence to perpetuate (Bourdieu, 1987a: 844).   
Bourdieu argues that symbolic violence can be revealed and ‘held in check’ by 
becoming aware of the arbitrariness of the power held by dominant groups.  This 
deprives the dominant of their symbolic strength by “sweeping away misrecognition” 
(Bourdieu, 1990a: 303 note 18).   
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2.3 APPLICATION OF CONCEPTS 
Diagram 2.1 illustrates the fields of interest in this thesis.  The field of law, or the 
juridical field, which surrounds the two subfields of child welfare and youth justice, is 
enclosed within the larger field of power or politics.  The bold arrows starting in the 
political field and entering the juridical represents the influence of the former over the 
latter.  Legislators in the political field make decisions which affect the juridical field.  
Power also flows in the other direction, but to a lesser extent.   
 
Diagram 2.1: Child Welfare and Youth Criminal Justice as Sub-fields of the 
Juridical, which is enclosed within the Political Field  
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 Take note of the overlapping of boundaries and positions in the youth criminal 
justice and child welfare fields.  This overlap demonstrates the common features of both 
fields, for instance, the presence of lawyers seems to be a necessity in both fields as child 
welfare becomes increasingly ‘legalized.’  The PCHIP Act occupies a section of overlap 
between the two fields to demonstrate that this legislation incorporates aspects of both 
fields.  The arrow across the PCHIP section illustrates the transference of ideas, rhetoric, 
and ultimately habitus between the two fields.    
 This thesis investigates the relationships pictured in diagram 2.1.  In my research, 
I apply Bourdieu’s concept of ‘field’ to the realms of politics, law, and youth criminal 
justice and child welfare.  Drawing from Bourdieu, I will conceive of these fields as 
semi-autonomous ‘worlds,’ each with their own logic.  His observation that the 
boundaries of these fields are imprecise, shifting, and permeable is especially important.  
Following Bourdieu’s imperative regarding the task of the social scientist, I will describe 
the state of struggles within and between these fields, thereby distinguishing and 
characterizing the boundary between them. 
 In my research, ‘habitus’ is used to describe the specific language and logic used 
by actors in the field, and to analyze the action in and across fields.  Drawing on the 
‘game’ analogy, one could conceive of the fields of politics, law, youth criminal justice 
and child welfare as games in which players employ various strategies to gain power over 
others.  For instance, actors involved in the legal realm (an assortment of judges and 
lawyers) battle one another by overturning judgements of ‘lesser’ players, and making 
statements about each other marked by a discourse and logic that is particular to the legal 
field.   
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 My analysis of the fields and positions included in diagram 2.1 will be supported 
by various sources of textual data in Chapters four through six.  In Chapter four I analyze 
several academic articles, a 2004 Alberta government report, and newspaper articles to 
outline the debate between proponents and detractors of the Act.  This is directly related 
to the boundaries illustrated in diagram 2.1, as proponents of the Act assume that the 
PCHIP Act belongs within the realm of child welfare, while critics argue that the Act is 
actually criminal justice legislation.   
 My contribution to this debate is two-fold.  First, I compare sections of the 
Criminal Code of Canada and the Child, Youth, and Family Enhancement Act to the 
PCHIP Act, in particular sections six and nine.  The purpose of this analysis is to 
investigate whether the implementation of the PCHIP Act added anything new to already 
existing provisions, thereby laying the foundation to comment on the influence of the 
juridical and political fields on the PCHIP Act in Chapter five.  My second contribution is 
a dissection of section 3 of the PCHIP Act, which outlines three responses available to 
authorities upon the apprehension of a youth suspected of involvement in prostitution.  
This analysis contributes to the debate between proponents and detractors of the Act.  
 Chapter five examines the constitutional challenge to the PCHIP Act, thereby 
delineating the struggles between the juridical and political fields pictured in diagram 2.1.  
Further, this examination illuminates the affect of these struggles on the child welfare and 
youth criminal justice sub-fields.  Several sources of textual data inform this analysis.  In 
particular, I draw upon written reasons provided by judges in three court cases, the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, newspaper articles, and the PCHIP Act and its 
amendments.   
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 Chapter six focuses on the youth confined under the PCHIP Act, shown in 
diagram 2.1 as occupying a place in which boundaries overlap.  This chapter contends 
that the boundary disputes described in Chapters four and five have particular 
consequences for female Aboriginal youth.  In addressing this problem, I draw on various 
sources of data, including scholarly articles, section three of the PCHIP Act, and a 
‘Notice to Child’ document which was served to a youth confined under the PCHIP Act.    
 Before I move on to these empirical chapters, it is first necessary to recognize that 
the state of struggles among and within fields is always the result of past struggles.  
According to Bourdieu, one cannot grasp the structure and dynamics of a field, as well as 
its relationship to power, without historical analysis: “all sociology should be historical 
and all history sociological” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 90).  In consideration of this 
imperative, the next chapter provides a historical analysis of the fields which are of 
interest in this thesis.  In particular, I focus on the development of the fields of child 
welfare and youth criminal justice.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL SOCIAL 
FIELDS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 
 
[U]nless a hand is stretched out to save the children, they will sink into still lower depths 
of society. Mary Carpenter, (1968) [1851]: 68. 
 
  We’re saving kids and that’s the important thing.  
Heather Forsyth (2000) 
 
The similarities between these two statements demonstrate the stable nature of the 
relationships characterizing the social field from the early 1800s to present.  Though 
these remarks are separated by over a century, the common theme of ‘child-saving’ is 
evident in each.   
 This chapter describes the social field in which responses to youth delinquency 
are located by investigating successive historical periods in England and Canada.  Since 
the latter was a colony of the former, legislation, discourse, and habitus regarding youth 
delinquency have been shared to some extent across these two countries.  Bourdieu 
states,  
 It is necessary to write a structural history which finds in each state of the 
 structure both the product of previous struggles to transform or conserve the 
 structure, and, through the contradictions, tensions and power relations that 
 constitute the structure, the source of its subsequent transformations (1990b: 42). 
 
 The following analysis demonstrates the inseparable nature between the social 
field and history from which it arose, by connecting the PCHIP Act to the continuum of 
responses to youth prostitution which have historically incorporated both justice and 
welfare ideals.  In addition to these ideals, beliefs and attitudes regarding geographic 
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location and the innate criminality of the poor and racialized have shaped our responses 
to youth deviancy.  As such, the historical trajectory of these attitudes, along with legal 
responses to youth prostitution, is presented and theoretically analyzed below. 
 
3.1 ENGLISH INFLUENCES 
Childhood was not seen as a time of special needs in the early 1800s in England.  As 
such, legislation aimed exclusively at vulnerable or problematic children did not yet exist 
in England or in Canada.  Young offenders received the same punishments as adults for 
criminal offences, including prostitution (May, 2002 and Bittle 2002a)20.  Several 
reformers protested such treatment, arguing that it was degrading and harsh.  Rather than 
physical punishment, these commentators recommended the more humane approach of 
short prison terms for juveniles (May, 2002).   
Despite the benevolent intentions of these reformers, the result of their efforts 
increased the criminalization of youth.  In fact, Foucault argues that the primary function 
of criminal justice reform movements was to make the punishment of illegalities a 
“regular function” (Foucault, 1995: 82).  Indeed, English reforms led to large numbers of 
children being confined in correctional facilities for petty offences such as vagrancy 
under the Vagrancy Act of 1824 (Shore, 2002: 161).  This period in England was 
characterized by a willingness to prosecute juveniles and send them to prison (Shore, 
2002: 163).   
The punishment of illegality disproportionately fell onto the lower classes.  This 
is evidenced by the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829, which criminalized individuals who 
were idle, disorderly, and/or loitering, as well as those who could not give a satisfactory 
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account of themselves (Magarey, 2002: 117).  Another English Act passed in 1839 
extended the categories of ‘arrestable’ people to include those:  
in unlicensed theatres, bear pits, at cock fights, dog fights, or badger-baiting; to 
people in gaming houses; and to people found in a thoroughfare or public place 
flying a kite, playing any game ‘to the annoyance of the inhabitants or 
passengers,’ or making a slide in the ice or snow (Magarey, 2002: 118).  
 
These prohibitions particularly targeted the leisurely activities of the poor class, and 
made London street-children vulnerable to arrest (Magarey, 2002: 118).  Foucault 
reminds us that the lower classes were attached to these emerging illegalities (Foucault, 
1995: 83).  He states, 
(C)rime is not a potentiality that interests or passions have inscribed in the hearts 
of all men, but that it is almost exclusively committed by a certain social class; 
that criminals, who were once to be met with in every social class, now emerged 
‘almost all from the bottom rank of the social order’ (1995: 275).  
 
Reformers often made blatant reference to the influence of class on delinquency.  For 
instance, Mary Carpenter (considered the ‘doyen’ of childsavers) stated “we have to view 
the child, not only in his individual position, but in relation to the class among which he 
is placed, and above which we desire to raise him” (1968 [1851]: 77). 
 Reformers linked class-based assumptions of criminality to beliefs about 
geography and environment.  In the mid 1800s, concern over housing arose, as filthy 
dwellings were viewed as an indication of crime (Rush, 2002: 146).  English 
Metropolitan Police magistrate Gilbert A’Beckett reported,  
I found the dwellings of the poor very much overcrowded, rendering it quite 
impossible that anything like morality or decency could be observed among the 
inmates, and leading, no doubt, to indiscriminate connection, bringing into 
existence a class of unfortunate children likely to prove very fertile sources of 
crime (as quoted in Rush, 2002: 147).  
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The assumed connection of poverty to these immoral dwellings is obvious, and gives rise 
to the notion of “class-bound delinquency” (Rush, 2002: 147).  In Canada, slum 
conditions and overcrowded housing were often blamed for causing delinquency 
(Sangster, 2002: 30-37).   
 
3.2 THE DISCOVERY OF YOUTH DELINQUENCY 
A new lexicon emerged to capture the ideological linkages of youth delinquency, class 
and race (Shore, 2002).  The ‘invention’ or ‘discovery’ of the term ‘youth delinquent’ 
occurred in the mid 1800s in England, and was arguably one of the crowning 
achievements of the reforming sentiment in the early decades of the nineteenth century 
(Rush, 2002 138).  This term was “legislated into existence” through a flurry of 
legislation aimed to target these youth (Magarey, 2002: 120)21.  The Juvenile Offenders 
Act of 1847 marked the first English legislative response to youth delinquency, though 
other policies indirectly relating to youth delinquency were already in force (for example, 
the Vagrancy Act of 1824) (Shore, 2002: 161).  These reforms provided recognition that 
juvenile delinquents were a separate category from adult offenders.   
Romantic and Evangelical notions of childhood were fused to “produce an image 
of the ‘innocent’ child, who needed to be given […] protection, guidance, love, and 
discipline” (Hendrick, 2002: 29).  At the heart of these legislative Acts were the ‘care and 
protection’ clauses (Hendrick, 2002: 29).  Images of rescuing neglected and delinquent 
children also emerged, following the assumption that youth were dependent and 
vulnerable (Clarke: 2002: 127 and 131, see also McLaren 1986: 133).  A strong emphasis 
on morality was also evident, encompassing moral discipline, moral management and 
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moral government (Rush, 2002: 141 and McLaren, 1986: 129-132).  These themes 
emerged as part of a broad ‘childsaving’ reform movement, whose proponents viewed 
‘wayward’ youth as requiring support and guidance rather than punishment (Winterdyk, 
1996: 2)22.   
‘Childsaving’ and the associated moral reformation were of utmost concern in the 
reform and industrial schools of the era, which had replaced penal incarceration for youth 
by the 1860s in England (Shore, 2002: 168).  Canada followed suit in 1879 by taking 
legislative steps to create industrial schools (McLaren, 1986: 133).  Whereas prisons 
served to punish through incapacitation, reformatories were to function as “moral 
hospitals,” with the aim of providing training for victims of neglect (May, 2002: 111, see 
also McLaren 1986).  It was hoped that reformatory and industrial schools would help 
youth offenders forget their old vices and become useful (working) members of society 
(Clarke, 2002: 129).  The overall aim was to instil new habits, dispositions, and 
behaviours in children from the lower classes, according to middle-class standards of 
morality (see Rush, 2002: 151 and McLaren 1986: 137).     
 Reformatory and industrial schools housed not only juvenile delinquents, but also 
children who were in need of ‘care and protection,’ which included orphans, children of 
criminals, and homeless youth (May, 2002: 98 and Carrigan 1991: 214).  As the end of 
the 1800s approached, the differences between reformatories and industrial schools had 
essentially disappeared, resulting in poor children receiving the same treatment as 
criminal youth (Shore, 2002: 168).   
  The control of female sexuality was a key aim of the reformatory movement, 
though generally females were less likely than males to be labelled ‘delinquent’ (Shore, 
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2002: 168). Female youth were imprisoned most often on the grounds of prostitution and 
sexual immorality, which included association with men deemed ‘undesirable’ (Carrigan, 
1991: 220).   
Female youth offenders were often deemed more incorrigible and ‘evil’ than their 
male counterparts23.  Though young girls were viewed as passive and requiring 
protection, they were also seen as potentially dangerous to middle-class norms regarding 
female sexuality and domesticity (Hudson, 2002: 297).  Young female offenders were 
viewed as hardened, corrupt women, due to their sexual knowledge while still in a 
physically immature state (Shore, 2002: 165).  Even girls who were victims of sexual 
abuse were placed in industrial schools, as they were ‘tainted’ by sexual knowledge 
(Shore, 2002: 168).  Class and ethnicity were additional factors in determining 
delinquency among young females.  In particular, it was working class and black girls 
who were vulnerable to state intervention in England (Hudson, 2002: 297).   
 
3.3 THE CANADIAN CONTEXT 
In Canada, legislative developments increased the vulnerability of Aboriginal women to 
state intervention.  The British North America (BNA) Act was passed in 1867, which 
granted power to the federal government to make laws governing Indians and their lands.  
In 1876, the Indian Act was passed.  This Act was composed of assimilationist and 
integrationist policies, with the aim of turning Indians into ‘ordinary citizens’ (Walmsley, 
2005: 8).   
A key part of the assimilationist strategy was the implementation of residential 
schools by the federal government, which Aboriginal children were legally required to 
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attend24.  The policy behind these schools was to “civilize, Christianize, and socialize 
Aboriginal children to work in the wage economy,” which would be accomplished by 
erasing their Aboriginal identity (Royal Commission Report on Aboriginal Peoples 
(RCAP), 1996).  The assumption behind these schools was that all Aboriginal children 
were born criminals, or at the very least, ‘wild’ or ‘animal-like’ (Monture-Angus, 1995: 
92).  Residential schools combined educational and childcare aims, yet were modelled 
after punitive industrial schools for juvenile delinquents in the United States (Sinclair, 
1991: 9).  Indeed, the parallels between residential and industrial schools are striking25.  
For instance, both involved rigid schedules and the forced silence of residents/inmates.  
Generations of children were separated from their families, their languages were 
suppressed, and attempts were made to resocialize the youth with European norms 
(RCAP, 1996).  These measures amounted to nothing less than cultural genocide 
(Schissel and Wotherspoon, 2003: 35).  Residential schools traumatized children and 
youth, and produced individuals who were unable to function in either Aboriginal or 
Euro-Canadian cultures (2003: 40).   
The passing of the Indian Act was followed by several criminal law amendments 
in England and Canada.  Within a habitus dominated by ‘moral fervour’ and ‘white 
slavery hysteria’26, England passed the Criminal Law Amendment Act in 1885, which 
targeted exploiters of prostitutes.  Canadian politicians produced similar bills scarcely a 
year after.  By 1892, the Canadian federal government passed a series of laws to the 
Criminal Code which aimed at protecting young women and children from those who 
would recruit them into prostitution.  Besides the influence of English legislation, these 
changes were also prompted by morally-toned concerns of religious groups (Bittle, 
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2002a).  The Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the Young Women’s Christian 
Association, and national protestant church bodies battled a number of ‘social evils,’ 
including prostitution and liquor (McLaren, 1986: 141).  An emphasis on the morality 
and protection of vulnerable women and youth formed an important part of the habitus 
during this period (see Sangster, 2002: 14, and McLaren 1986: 140).   
The rhetoric of protection was far removed from the practical applications of the 
new laws, however.  Laws that criminalized prostitution continued to be enforced, and 
female prostitutes continued to be punished rather than male purchasers (Bittle, 2002a: 4, 
McLaren 1986: 142).  Protectionist discourse hid the punitive realities of these laws.  
Many youth served lengthy prison sentences, ostensibly for the purposes of their own 
protection.  Similar to the circumstances in England, class and race strongly influenced 
which youth were incarcerated.  It was mainly working class and immigrant youth who 
were apprehended (Bittle, 2002a: 4).   
The prevailing protectionist rhetoric framed other Canadian legislative 
developments, such as the establishment of Children’s Aid Societies in the 1890s, and the 
passing of the Children’s Protection Act in 1893.  These developments granted the 
Societies legal power to remove neglected and abandoned children from their homes 
(Bala, 1991:2).  Child protection legislation was later enacted in each province, and has 
remained within provincial jurisdiction to date.  The field of child welfare had been born.    
The field of youth criminal justice was born soon after, with the passing of the 
Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA) in Canada in 1908.  The JDA, as criminal law, was 
federal in scope.  An emphasis on treatment, welfare and rehabilitation dominated 
discussions on youth delinquency, as well as protectionist and child-saving rhetoric 
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carried over from the previous century.  Two concepts originating in British law were of 
critical importance in the framing of the JDA.  The principle of doli capax was adopted, 
along with parens patriae (referring to the responsibility of the state to assume parental 
responsibility over a child) (Sangster, 2002: 14-15).  Legislative developments in the 
United States also impacted the passing of the JDA (Trepanier: 1999)27.   
Under the JDA, promiscuous girls who had not broken the law could be 
incarcerated for their own protection, for the purpose of moral re-education (Sangster, 
2002: 3).  Status offences, that is, offences relating to morality or character, criminalized 
children in danger of becoming criminal.  Promiscuity, incorrigibility, and running away 
from home were status offences for which youth could be detained.  Compared with their 
male counterparts, a large proportion of delinquency charges against girls resulted from 
these status offences regarding ‘boy trouble’ (Sangster, 2002: 75).  These charges were 
mediated by race and class.  If the parents of the girl were deemed upstanding and 
respectable, their daughter was less likely to be sent to training school.  In cases of 
promiscuity, the respectability of the male fundamentally determined the guilt or 
innocence of the female.  Engaging in ‘sexual immorality’ with ‘undesirable’ men (men 
who were older, in conflict with the law, or of a different racial background than the girl) 
increased the odds that the female would be sent away (Sangster, 2002: 83-5).   
Certain ethnicities and social classes were assumed to be in greater need of 
protection than other groups (Sangster, 2002: 3).  In particular, state ‘benevolence’ was 
directed at the ‘dangerous classes,’ which included working class and Aboriginal girls.  
By providing protection to these groups, it was assumed that they would develop into 
moral adults (Sangster, 2002: 32).  The strongest theme attached to girls’ delinquency 
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was sexual immorality, which included prostitution, promiscuity, and having illegitimate 
pregnancies (Sangster, 2002).  This preoccupation with sexual purity was epitomized by a 
1924 amendment which made it possible for girls to be guilty of ‘sexual immorality or 
any similar form of vice’ (Sangster, 2002: 71).  This amendment gave judges more power 
to punish girls’ sexual behaviour.           
Though the JDA was passed as criminal justice legislation, youth guilty of sexual 
immorality (including prostitution or promiscuity) could be detained for an indefinite 
period of time by child welfare jurisdictions (Bagley et al, 1991: 126).  In fact, child 
welfare agencies had considerable responsibility for delinquent youth right up until the 
1960s (Bala, 1991: 3).  Conversely, youth who were neglected or abused, or seen as likely 
to break a law, could be detained under the JDA, since the JDA’s mandate included 
children ‘in need of guidance and supervision’ (Sangster, 2002: 5 and 19).  The boundary 
between child welfare and criminal justice signified a jurisdictional issue between the 
federal and provincial governments – though the JDA fell under the criminal code (which 
was federal), it also involved child welfare aspects which were under provincial 
jurisdiction.  Similar to the case in England, the boundaries between the fields of child 
welfare and youth criminal justice appear indistinct during this period28.  
In addition to the permeability between child welfare and justice, relationships 
with other fields increased starting in the 1930s.  There was a growing symbiosis between 
social services, educational institutions, and the criminal justice system, along with the 
emergence of the modern ‘expert’ (Sangster, 2002: 17)29.  Those trained in medicine, 
social sciences and social work helped judges to define what was criminal, delinquent 
and immoral (Sangster, 2002: 19).  Other experts included police, Children’s Aid Society 
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workers, and probation officers, psychologists and psychiatrists, and organizations such 
as Big Sisters (Sangster, 2002: 20-1).  During and after World War II, psychiatrists in 
particular became extremely influential in determining delinquency and normality30.  
Psychiatric advice often promoted ideals which concurred with patriarchal, white, middle 
class values (Sangter, 2002: 21).   
Unfortunately, psychiatric and medical knowledge during the 1940s and 1950s 
tended to ignore issues of sexual abuse and incest.  At best, the dominant medical 
discourse downplayed these issues (Sangster, 2002: 125).  These were seen as 
uncommon, and occurring primarily among the lower class.  It was assumed that incest 
victims were complicit in their abuse, especially if the female were deemed promiscuous.  
Girls who were victims of sexual abuse were often sent to training schools to receive 
moral training to overcome their ‘contamination’ (Sangster, 2002: 87-8).   
 In 1951, Section 88 was added to the Indian Act, which authorized the extension 
of child welfare services to Aboriginal children (Sinclair et al., 1991: 183)31.  Prior to 
1951, Aboriginal children who were seen to be in need of protection were “apprehended 
by Indian agents and were either placed with another family on the reserve or sent to 
residential schools” (Sinclair et al., 1991: 183).   
Welfare services began to be provided to Aboriginal families by 1952.  
Apprehension and removal of Aboriginal children from their families and reserves was 
legalized by a 1955 policy, and by the late 1950s, Aboriginal children were 
overrepresented in the child welfare system (Walmsley, 2005: 2).  The trend toward 
removing Aboriginal children from their families would later become to be known as the 
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“sixties scoop” (Walmsley, 2005: 21, see also McEvoy and Daniluk 1995).  One social 
worker remarks:  
Provincial social workers would, quite literally, scoop children from reserves on 
the slightest pretext, because they believed that what they were doing was in the 
best interests of the child…they felt that the apprehension of Indian children from 
reserves would save them from the effects of crushing poverty, unsanitary health 
conditions, poor housing, and malnutrition (Johnston, 1983: 23).    
 
Powerful protectionist rhetoric justified state intervention into Aboriginal families.  To 
‘protect’ these children, many were placed in non-Aboriginal foster homes, care facilities, 
or were adopted by non-Aboriginal families wherever they could be found (Walmsley, 
2005 and Sinclair et al, 1991)32.  Child welfare functioned to remove Aboriginal children 
and youth from their cultural identity and heritage (Monture, 1989: 3, see also Sinclair et 
al., 1991: 171).   
Aboriginal youth became overrepresented in training schools after 1951, 
mirroring the trend that was occurring in child welfare (Sangster, 2002: 7).  Social 
workers believed that Aboriginal girls would be saved from sexual immorality through 
moral surveillance (Sangster, 2002: 150).  Similar to working-class white girls, sexual 
promiscuity was the major reason that Aboriginal girls were sent to training schools.  
However, decisions to incarcerate Aboriginal girls also resulted from racist beliefs about 
their ‘inferior’ culture and ‘primitiveness’ which were not factors in determining 
delinquency among white youth (Sangster, 2002: 156).   
By the mid-1960s, critiques were emerging against reform and training schools.  
The legal community, politicians, and reform groups such as the Elizabeth Fry Society 
pressured the (provincial) government of Ontario to revise rationales for incarcerating 
girls.  In response to this pressure, the charge of ‘incorrigibility’ was removed as a 
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justification for federal incarceration (Sangster, 2002: 173).  This charge was transferred 
to provincial responsibility, effectively narrowing the jurisdiction of the JDA.   
Besides the issue of incorrigibility, children’s rights issues were raised.  It was 
argued that youth delinquents should be extended the same rights that incarcerated adults 
had, such as the right to counsel, to appeal, to not be detained unnecessarily, and to have 
a clear charge against them (Sangster, 2002: 173).  It was decided that these rights would 
be safeguarded by requiring judges to hear children’s evidence and to provide a written 
record of the reasons for training school placements (Sangster, 2002: 141).   
The late 1970s and early 1980s were marked by a ‘discovery’ of child sexual 
abuse (Bala, 1991: 3-4).   This development was paralleled by a concern over youth 
prostitution.  Since the mid 1980s especially, an ‘explosion’ of interest and research has 
occurred pertaining to incest and child sexual abuse (McEvoy and Daniluk, 1995: 1).  
Understandings of sexual abuse had changed, perhaps due to feminist writing and politics 
(Sangster, 2002: 88 and Bagley et al., 1991: 110).  A greater willingness to address 
women’s sexual abuse as contributing to their problems with the law became evident (for 
example, see Comack 1996 and McEvoy and Daniluk 1995).   
 
3.4 LAW AND ORDER 
The 1980s signified a fundamental shift in the habitus of the social field.  While the 
ideals of rehabilitation and treatment had previously shaped responses to youth 
delinquency (at least rhetorically, if not in practice), a ‘law-and-order’ or ‘crime-control’ 
model became dominant by the 1980s, in England, Canada and the United States (see 
Carlen: 1988, Edwards: 1987, Garland: 1996 and 2001, and Wacquant: 2001).  Sangster 
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notes that it is remarkable how quickly the ideals of the earlier juvenile justice system 
evaporated (2002: 177).  One indicator of this shift was the infiltration of the legal system 
into the child welfare realm.  Child welfare became increasingly ‘legalized,’ that is, 
dependent on lawyers and judges to decide upon child welfare issues, during the 1980s.  
Legal advice became important in formulating policies and procedures to avoid illegal 
practices (Blishen, 1991: 195).  The legalization of child welfare has caused lawyers to 
replace laypersons in child protection cases, as well as the increased frequency of 
representation of all parties involved, including children and parents (Felstiner et al., 
1991: 312).   
Two important pieces of legislation were passed in the wake of the increasing 
legalization of the child welfare field.  As part of the repatriation of the constitution, the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was passed in 1982.  This granted 
constitutionally-guaranteed individual rights.  This had important implications for both 
child welfare and justice practices, as constitutional challenges against legislation became 
possible.  The courts would be given a new role in overseeing the legality of government 
action (Bakan et al., 2003: 7).  It appeared that the previous disregard for young 
offenders’ rights under the JDA would be remedied by the Charter.   
Following the passing of the Charter, the Young Offenders Act (YOA) came into 
effect in 1984, replacing the JDA.  The YOA can be seen as the focal point of the law-
and-order campaign (Schissel, 2006: 9).  The ideals which governed the JDA, including 
protection, treatment, and child-saving, was replaced by an ideology which emphasized 
punitive responses and blaming children (Sangster, 2002: 11).   
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The YOA paid tribute to the individual rights espoused by the Charter, by 
affording to youth the same rights held by adults in legal matters and proceeding.  For 
example, the YOA ensured that accused youth received legal representation in court and 
were informed of their rights (Schissel, 2006: 9).  Due process and youth accountability 
for their crimes were also emphasized (Sangster, 2002: 177).  The YOA was also 
supposed to ensure that, as much as possible, young offenders were to be “directed away 
from the formal legal process and toward alternative measures, including community-
based programs of reparation and mediation” (Schissel, 2006: 10).  The arbitrary 
detention of young females who were suspected of engaging, or likely engaging, in 
prostitution was officially ended with the passing of the YOA (Bagley et al., 1991: 126).  
Status offences were removed altogether, which was seen as progressive (Sangster, 2002: 
177).  However, some argue that the removal of status offences such as immorality has 
merely caused the re-labelling of these offences as sexual offences under the New 
Criminal Code, or as medical problems which require mandatory institutionalization.  
Thus, girls’ sexuality was still targeted by regulation, while similar behaviour was 
overlooked in the case of their male counterparts.   
The same year that the YOA came into effect, the Report of the Committee on 
Sexual Offences Against Children and Youth (aka ‘The Badgley Report’) was published.  
The purpose of this committee was to investigate the prevalence of sexual offences 
against children and youth in Canada, as well as juvenile prostitution and the exploitation 
of youth in pornography (Badgley et al, 1984: 3).  This Report was novel in that it 
considered youth prostitution within the context of child sexual abuse (Bagley et al., 
1991: 117)33.  The Report was instrumental in changing societal response to youth 
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prostitution.  It recognized that criminal justice responses to youth prostitution had been 
ineffective, so the issue was reframed as a child welfare issue.   
The Badgley report invoked contradictory ideologies in some of its 
recommendations.  For example, with regard to recommendation 45, committee members 
refer to the ‘tragic plight’ of youth prostitutes, and opine that social initiatives are 
preferable to legal initiatives.  However, they go on to recommend that criminal sanctions 
against youth prostitutes were necessary because this group does not seek out these social 
initiatives (see Badgley et al., 1984: 94-5)34.  The homelessness of these youth further 
justified their criminalization; the committee members argued that it was necessary to 
save ‘street-kids’ from themselves by imposing treatment (Lowman, 1991: 300).   
 The Badgley committee did attempt to target clients of prostitutes by 
recommending amendments to the Criminal Code which would punish clients of youth 
prostitutes.  Bill C-15 was introduced in 1988 in response to this recommendation.  The 
Bill included provisions that criminalized the sexual procurement of youth, ostensibly 
making it easier for police to arrest pimps and johns.  However, these provisions were 
difficult for police to enforce, since they required the offender to be caught in the act 
(Bittle, 2002a: 11).  Consequently, only a handful of charges were ever laid against those 
who procured youth prostitutes (Lowman, 1991: 301).   
  The Badgely report had brought attention to two competing images of youth 
prostitution:  the young offender who deserves criminal sanctions versus the young 
victim who needs help.  Recommendations put forth in the 1990s demonstrate that the 
latter conceptualization would dictate official policy.  Bittle states: 
By the mid 1990s, a policy shift had occurred whereby young prostitutes were no 
longer conceptualized as “deviants” or “criminals” in need of punishment.  
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Instead, youth prostitution was viewed as a form of sexual abuse, and therefore 
young prostitutes were victims who need protection (2002a: 12).   
 
Though youth prostitutes as young offenders disappeared from official rhetoric coming 
from the government, this ideology would continue to affect how legislation was carried 
out in practice.    
In 1992, a Working Group was created to examine “legislation, policy and  
practices concerning prostitution-related activities and bring forward recommendations to 
address problems posed by prostitution” (Bittle, 2002a: 11).  Youth involvement in 
prostitution was designated as a primary issue of concern.  A final report was released in 
1998, and included several recommendations specific to youth prostitution.  It was 
advised that youth involved in prostitution should be seen as needing assistance, not as 
young offenders.  Additionally, it was recommended that interdisciplinary protocols 
should be developed, involving child welfare and the police as first responses and the 
criminal justice system as a last resort.  The Working Group also recommended that 
alternative measures be developed to deal with the issue, and that improved services be 
provided to youth involved (or at risk to be involved) in prostitution.  While all these 
recommendations are important to the later implementation of the PCHIP Act, the shift in 
philosophy from conceptualizing youth prostitutes as victims rather than offenders is 
particularly important.   
This ‘new’ philosophical paradigm (reminiscent of protectionist rhetoric which 
had long been a feature of discussions of youth prostitution) was taken up the Task Force 
on Children Involved in Prostitution, formed in Alberta in May 1996.  The Task Force 
was chaired by Heather Forsyth, who was then a backbencher MLA in Ralph Klein’s 
government.  Members of the Calgary and Edmonton Police Services, Child Welfare, and 
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the Young Offender’s Branch of Alberta Justice were also on the Task Force.  Absent 
from the Task Force were Aboriginal and women’s groups (Koshan, 2003: 216 footnote 
33).  The Task Force was initiated partly because of the death of a child who had been 
sexually exploited (Alberta Children’s Services, 2004: 1).  The Task Force report states,  
The Task Force believes these children [young prostitutes] should be seen as 
victims of abuse.  The children, if not abused while at home, are certainly victims 
of sexual abuse when they are used by either a pimp or a john.  It is within this 
philosophical framework that the Task Force formed its recommendations (Task 
Force on Children Involved in Prostitution, 1997: 3). 
 
The characterization of youth prostitutes as victims of sexual abuse is of 
fundamental importance.  Though it was not novel to conceive of these youth as victims 
generally, it was new to refer to their exploitation as sexual abuse specifically.  Since 
their exploitation was framed this way, it became impossible to view these children as 
anything other than victims – certainly they could not be young offenders and sexual 
abuse victims simultaneously. 
Important recommendations from the Task Force included the need for 
“collaborative case management’ and the creation of a “Children Involved in Prostitution 
Act” (Bittle, 2002a: 13).  According to the Task Force, the Act would provide legislative 
support for a continuum of services for children involved in prostitution.  Services would 
be provided for both those who wished to leave and those who did not wish to leave 
prostitution.  Additionally, penalties for pimps and johns would be contemplated (Bittle, 
2002a: 13).   
 
 
 
 49
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The PCHIP Act was passed within a social field which has drawn upon a habitus 
continuously created over a historical process.  Though the habitus, over time, remained 
stable in some aspects, new components were incorporated while others diminished.  
Discourses regarding protection and ‘child saving’ have remained central in policies 
aimed at youth delinquency since the late 1800s, especially in measures targeting youth 
prostitution.  As the passing of the PCHIP demonstrates, the ideology that youth are 
vulnerable and need protection has remained extremely influential in current policy.  
However, the counter-dialogue that youth prostitutes are offenders still remains, for in 
practice, the PCHIP Act functions to criminalize youth by confining them.   
Thus, the PCHIP Act manages to fulfill two opposing ideologies in the habitus.  
The idea that youth prostitutes are victims is maintained, since these youth are called 
‘sexual abuse victims’ and measures to address this are couched in protectionist rhetoric 
(for example, the term ‘protective safehouse’).  However, the counter-discourse that these 
youth are offenders is also perpetuated, as the detainment of these youth in protective 
safehouses can be considered disciplinary.   
Along with these dual ideologies, concerns over geography (slum areas), poverty 
and race have long framed responses to youth deviance and child prostitution 
specifically.  The PCHIP Act has embodied these issues by disproportionately detaining 
homeless Aboriginal females.     
This effect of the PCHIP Act has not gone unnoticed.  After it was passed, a 
scholarly debate developed over the nature, effectiveness, and ethicality of the PCHIP 
Act.  The disproportionate detention of Aboriginal females was problematized by several 
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authors.  However, government reports supported the Act, with several newspaper 
articles following suit.  A critical analysis of the PCHIP Act is necessary to assess this 
debate.  It is to such an analysis that we now turn.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE PCHIP ACT 
The passing of the PCHIP Act was followed by a debate in academic literature, public 
reports, and newspaper articles.  Reports and press releases put out by the Alberta 
Government, newspaper articles, and some scholarly articles argued that the PCHIP Act 
was necessary and ethical.  Examples of this side of the debate include the Alberta 
Children’s Services 2004 report Protection of Children Involved in Prostitution: 
Protective Safe House Review and Grover (2002)35.  The stances and arguments 
presented in these articles were countered by other research, including Busby et al. 
(2002), Koshan (2003) and Kinsley and Mark (2000), who contend that the Act is 
ineffective in providing alternatives to youth involved in prostitution, and functioned to 
criminalize already marginalized groups.   
 My contribution to this debate is a comparison between the provisions allowed 
under the PCHIP Act and those allowed under the Criminal Code and the Child, Youth, 
and Family Enhancement Act.  This comparison demonstrates the fundamental 
redundancy of the PCHIP Act, thereby contributing to critical research pertaining to the 
PCHIP Act. 
 
4.1 CURRENT DEBATE 
The Alberta Children’s Services 2004 report and Grover (2002) both argue that the Act is 
underutilized.  Specifically, Grover (2002) criticizes the PCHIP Act on grounds that 
street kids besides those involved in prostitution are not also ‘protected’ under the Act.  
She states:    
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[The PCHIP Act] is completely silent as to the governmental responsibilities to 
 safeguard the “best interests” of other classes of street youth.  It is particularly 
 curious that the PCHIP Act is so narrowly focused on children involved in 
 prostitution, rather than upon ensuring the safety and security of any child found 
 on the street; whether involved in prostitution or not.  One cannot help but wonder 
 if the notion of children engaged in prostitution more readily disturbs the 
 conscience of the dominant society; perhaps more readily conjuring up notions of 
 exploitation than is the case for the image of a drug abusing teen not involved in 
 prostitution.  However, it should be emphasized that all children on the street are 
 vulnerable and inevitably will be exploited on the street, sexually and/or 
 otherwise, as they most often have already been prior to their arrival there.  The 
 PCHIP Act thus can be said to be underinclusive to the extent that it does not seek 
 to remove all children from the street and return them to their guardians, if the 
 latter can provide them a safe and secure environment, or to find an alternative 
 such placement where the former is not possible (Grover, 2002: 322, italics 
 original).  
 
This passage reveals that Grover takes for granted that the PCHIP Act is 
beneficial for those youth who are detained under it.  However, she presents no evidence 
that supports this assumption.  Further, it is telling that she assumes that all children 
confined under the PCHIP Act are in fact homeless.  As I argue later, the PCHIP Act is 
structured to disproportionately incarcerate homeless youth.  The fact that Grover starts 
from this assumption demonstrates a tacit acceptance that the PCHIP Act is meant to 
target homeless youth, though this goal is nowhere officially stated in the Act itself.   
Grover makes several debatable claims in the article.  For instance, she contends 
that children detained under PCHIP should automatically be given child welfare Status, 
so that their ‘treatment’ can be lengthened, thus fulfilling Charter obligations to these 
vulnerable young people (Grover, 2002: 317).  However, there are several problems with 
this claim.  First, Grover is apparently unaware that virtually all children detained under 
PCHIP already have child welfare status, a fact confirmed by the Alberta government 
(Alberta Children’s Services, 2004: 24).  Second, Grover incorrectly assumes that 
assigning child welfare status to children confined under PCHIP will facilitate their 
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treatment.  In my experience as a front-line group home worker at a so-called ‘treatment’ 
facility for children with child welfare status, I have seen no proof that the assignation of 
child welfare status facilitates meaningful ‘treatment.’  On the contrary, I can attest that 
such residences operated under child welfare (such as ‘treatment group homes,’ or other 
institutions) may do more harm to children than good (see Walmsley, 2005: 87 and 119; 
Monture-Angus, 1989).  Further, children with a history of prostitution, real or perceived, 
may not be welcome at group homes, and are considered “not a good match” at such 
institutions (Alberta Children’s Services, 2004: 29).  Third, Grover ignores the fact that 
19 percent of the children held at the ‘protective safehouses’ under PCHIP go AWOL 
(absent without leave) immediately upon release, making child welfare status and 
placements completely irrelevant (Alberta Children’s Services, 2004: 49).   
Some of these oversights can also be found in the Alberta Children’s Services 2004 
report.  Though this report addresses the monetary efficacy of the Act, it ignores other 
crucial issues, such as the ethicality of detaining youth who are not convicted of any 
crime.  The report criticizes others who have questioned the ethicality of the Act, stating 
“Critics of PCHIP have focused on the ethics, not the efficacy, of confining children as a 
means to facilitate protection” (Alberta Children’s Services, 2004: Major research 
findings), as though the ethicality of the Act is self-evident. 
Similar to Grover (2002), the Alberta government criticizes the Act by stating that it 
does not go ‘far enough.’  Citing the decrease of apprehensions as a problem, the 
authors36 argue that the PCHIP Act may be missing parts of the target population (Alberta 
Children’s Services, 2004: extent of use and reach of the PCHIP initiative).  The report 
states: 
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Male children, children involved in underground prostitution through the internet, 
and those who may be engaged in non-traditional forms of prostitution such as 
“survival sex,” were all mentioned by stakeholders and staff as groups that may not 
be fully reached by the initiative at present.  Police and child protection workers 
may not be using PCHIP legislation for apprehensions in suitable cases to the extent 
as they could, or to the extent that they have in the past (Alberta Children’s 
Services, 2004: extent of use and reach of the PCHIP initiative).     
 
The document presents decreasing apprehensions as proof that not enough youth are 
being targeted, though one could question their logic – why aren’t the decreasing 
apprehension numbers considered proof that the PCHIP program is working?  Since the 
program has been in place since 1999, fewer apprehensions would evidence the 
effectiveness of the program.  It is as though even the Alberta government does not 
believe that the PCHIP Act will decrease the numbers of youth prostitutes in the 
province.  The government does not offer evidence that there are child prostitutes that are 
not being reached, other than a “feeling” that this is the case (Alberta Children’s Services, 
2004: 31).  Among other reasons, they cite ‘negative attitudes about confining children’ 
as causing the low number of apprehensions, as though these attitudes are naturally 
incorrect or invalid. 
 The Alberta government report especially emphasizes the cost effectiveness of the 
‘protective safe houses’ throughout.  They state, 
The major barrier to increased cost effectiveness for the protective safe houses was 
felt to be the relatively low level of apprehensions, and the consequent under-
utilization of staff and low occupancy rates.  Occupancy rates for the fiscal year 
2002-2003 were 55% for the Edmonton protective safe house, and 20% for the 
Calgary facility.  Only 4 PCHIP client days were recorded for the Lethbridge 
protective safe house for that year (Alberta Children’s Services, 2004: cost 
effectiveness of the Protective Safe Houses). 
 
Increasing the number of apprehensions was a major recommendation for the report.  In 
particular, the report advises that children on First Nations reserves may represent a 
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source of increased apprehensions, as “stakeholders were concerned that involvement in 
prostitution for children on Aboriginal reserves was perhaps not being sufficiently 
addressed” (Alberta Children’s Services, 2004: 32).   
 In addition to criticizing the low level of apprehensions and resulting cost 
ineffectiveness, the report argues that periods of confinement are too short.  The report 
states, “even 26-day confinement periods were not necessarily long enough to facilitate 
significant changes in a client’s life” (Alberta Children’s Services, 2004: 33).  This 
argument rests on the unproven assumption that any length of confinement helps youth to 
exit prostitution.   
 The report provides a list of services offered at the protective safe houses.  In 
Edmonton, services include (but are not limited to) addictions treatment, equestrian 
training, and cultural awareness.  However, the quality (or existence) of these services is 
suspect.  For instance, the addictions treatment largely consisted of having the youth 
watch movies about drug or alcohol abuse.  While this was probably not detrimental to 
the youth, the high frequency of drug addiction among the youth (particularly to crystal 
meth) requires services beyond merely watching movies.  Services promoting cultural 
awareness were similarly lacking.  The inclusion of ‘equestrian training’ on this list of 
services is puzzling, as I did not see a horse nor gymkhana on the grounds surrounding 
the safe house.   
 Rather than rehabilitative services, the treatment offered at the Edmonton safe 
house was primarily regulatory in nature.  Adherence to the daily schedule was the 
paramount concern, rather than providing protective or rehabilitative services.  This 
schedule dictated virtually all activity over the course of a day.  The youth were expected 
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to get up at a certain time, no earlier and no later.  During my employment as a front-line 
worker, I encountered a girl who liked to get up earlier than the rest of the girls, so she 
could shower first.  Front-line staff problematized this behaviour, as it did not quite 
adhere to the schedule.  One morning, on her way to the shower, staff engaged her in a 
battle of wills which escalated into the physical restraint of the girl.  She was forced into 
the ‘time-out’ room37, where she remained until she calmed down.  Clearly, this 
exemplifies the disciplinary nature of the PHCIP Act – adherence to the schedule takes 
priority over everything else, including the emotional and physical safety of the youth. 
 Another observation which exemplifies the nature of the Act occurred overnight 
during an intake procedure with a newly-arrived youth.  When the youth arrived and saw 
that the doors were being locked behind her, she reacted by throwing her shoes at a staff 
member and becoming extremely agitated.  She was deemed to be ‘a threat to herself or 
others,’ and was placed in the time-out room.  After she had calmed down, she submitted 
to the intake procedure and was sent off to her room.  As she was a new resident, the bed 
was not made (in fact, the bed was leaning up against the wall).  As it was very late at 
night and the girl was clearly exhausted, I helped her make the bed.  After finishing this 
task, I was reprimanded by my supervisor for aiding the girl.  The supervisor argued that 
we needed to ‘get tough’ and ‘crack down’ on these girls as soon as they arrived, since 
they needed to know who was in charge.  This attitude is completely at odds with the 
attitude staff are ‘supposed’ to have toward the girls – officially, the PCHIP Act views 
the youth as victims of sexual assault who require protection (See Protection of Children 
Involved in Prostitution Act, Preamble).  Clearly, there is a discrepancy between official 
rhetoric and attitudes encouraged among the staff.   
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 Although both Grover’s (2002) article and the report released by Alberta 
Children’s Services appear to be critical of the Act, neither is critical of the essence of the 
Act itself – the confinement of youth who have not been convicted of any crime.  
Documents such as these limit public debate pertaining to the Act – rather than framing 
the debate around the legality or the ethicality of the Act, smaller, insignificant debates 
are formed which presume that the larger issue has been resolved (that the PCHIP Act is 
ethical and legal).  The narrowness of the debate over the Act is demonstrated by several 
newspaper articles I will discuss next.   
 The article “Review faults Alberta’s child prostitution program” highlights the 
finding that apprehensions are too low, and many of the target population is being 
missed, such as “natives on reserves” (Edmonton Journal, 2005: A14).  The article 
includes various quotes from supporters of the Act, including Kourch Chan, who 
manages the outreach program “Crossroads,” which has supported the Act since it was 
passed in 1999.  He states “the presence of children on the street has decreased because 
of this act” (Edmonton Journal, 2005: A14).  In the same article, then-Children Services 
Minister Heather Forsyth stated, “we’re saving kids and that’s the most important thing” 
(Edmonton Journal, 2005: A14), though neither she or Chan offer any evidence to 
support their statements.   
On February 23, 2005, the article “Flaws in child prostitution program” also 
emphasized the low number of apprehensions (Edmonton Journal, 2005: A18).  The 
article further comments on the lack of follow-up measures which could provide evidence 
that the program is working (Edmonton Journal, 2005: A18).  The newspaper article calls 
the Alberta government report a “good, critical assessment of a controversial and 
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groundbreaking effort” (Edmonton Journal, 2005: A18).  A similar article appeared in 
Yahoo News Canada on February 24, 2005.  “Report finds weakness in Alberta’s 
landmark child prostitution program” comments on the low number of apprehensions and 
repeats the recommendations put forth in the Alberta government report.   
The overall problem with these newspaper articles is that they remain within the 
debate boundaries set out by the Alberta government report – the articles do not challenge 
the validity or legality of the Act itself; they merely echo concerns voiced in the report 
which presume that the Act is valid.  Another problem is the media’s focus on Aboriginal 
youth – the newspaper accounts repeat the ‘finding’ that Aboriginal youth on reserves are 
not sufficiently benefiting from the Act.  This may lead readers to stereotype Aboriginal 
youth as being involved, or at-risk of becoming involved, in prostitution.    
Busby et al. (2002), Kingsley and Mark (2000) and Koshan (2003) represent 
important challenges to the ethicality of the PCHIP Act, in contrast to the articles 
assessed above.  Busby et al. (2002), titled “Examination of Innovative Programming for 
Children and Youth Involved in Prostitution,” was undertaken by a number of 
academics38.  Unlike the 2004 report released by the Alberta Government, Busby et al. 
(2002) included interviews of 45 women who had been involved in prostitution, all who 
had entered the sex trade before the age of 18.    
The interviewees generally spoke negatively about child welfare agencies, instead 
favouring agencies which “were perceived to be less coercive, more flexible and that 
allowed youth to have greater input into programming” (Busby et al. 2002: 7-8)39.  This 
sentiment was also found among the youth prostitutes interviewed by Kingsley and Mark, 
who found that youth require safe and non-judgemental centres staffed by those who used 
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to be involved in the sex trade (2000: 63).  Additionally, the provision of basic hygiene 
was mentioned by the respondents in Busby et al.’s (2002) study.  One woman stated that 
“providing a safe place where prostituted girls could sleep, shower and wash their clothes 
would give them ‘some dignity’” (2002: 9-10).  Meal routines followed at secure 
treatment centres were identified as problematic by some interviewees; more flexibility in 
this schedule would be of benefit (2002: 10).   
 The respondents in Busby et al. (2002) were critical of the PCHIP Act because 
they thought it would push prostitution ‘underground’ (leading to ‘bad stuff’ happening 
because it is less visible), and retaliation from pimps for being away from work due to the 
confinement period (Busby et al., 2002: 14).  Though few respondents reported utilizing 
agencies to exit prostitution, those who did use agencies were more likely to use 
voluntary services.  Busby et al. report:  
 The majority of women who had been apprehended under child welfare 
 legislation were very supportive of voluntary services and suspicious of mandated 
 services (2002: 17).   
 
A majority of the women interviewed supported programs run by staff that actually had 
experience living on the street (2002: 18).   
 Busby et al. point out that the services which are most likely to be approached and 
utilized by youth prostitutes (voluntary services which focus on harm reduction and 
advocacy) are less likely to retain funding than programs which focus on apprehension 
and confinement, such as the PCHIP Act (2002: 18).  They suggest that the federal 
government promote secure funding of the former type, fund studies to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of these services, and provide more shelters and safe homes for street youth 
(2002: 18).  Kingsely and Mark suggest similar provisions, with a particular emphasis on 
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youth sex trade workers having an active role in “creating and running drop-in centres” 
and “creating, developing, and delivering specific programs for commercially sexually 
exploited Aboriginal youth” (2000: 74).   
According to Koshan (2003) the PCHIP Act adopts a “radically different 
approach” than what is advocated by Busby (2002) and Kingsley and Mark (2000).  
Taking a critical stance toward PCHIP, Koshan directly challenges the targeting of 
specific types of youth.  She states:   
Any legislation which targets a social group that is disproportionately female, 
racialized, and poor should be seen as suspect in equality terms-in fact, it can be 
characterized as state action that directly discriminates against members of these 
groups (2003: 235).   
 
Koshan further argues that a number of “harmful consequences” are perpetuated against 
youth prostitutes under the PCHIP Act, such as the “criminalization and stereotyping of 
women and other marginalized groups” (2003: 218).  What were previously viewed as 
‘bad choices’ made by youth (who they associate with, where they ‘hang out,’ and what 
they wear) are essentially made criminal by the PCHIP Act, since these choices may lead 
to confinement (2003: 223).  She argues,  
 (T)he effect of the legislation is to impose coercive measures, along with their 
 attendant harms, on females, Aboriginal, and other racialized youth, and those 
 who are disadvantaged by social and economic conditions (2003: 235).  
 
 Critiques of the PCHIP Act and ‘secure treatment’ are not limited to academic 
literature.  The British Columbia organization ‘Justice for Girls’ argues that forced 
confinement does not work40.  It states,  
 Rather than detaining sexually exploited youth women, there needs to be a greater 
 focus and determination toward charging, convicting and containing pimps and 
 johns under the Criminal Code” (Justice For Girls, 2008).   
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Similarly, the Declaration and Agenda for Action put forth by the ‘Out from the 
Shadows’ summit41 submits the following recommendation for legislative action: “Our 
laws must protect us as sexually exploited children and youth and no longer punish us as 
criminals” (International Centre to Combat Exploitation of Children,1998).   
 The two sides of the debate have divergent views on the essence of the PCHIP 
Act.  The key question seems to be: is the PCHIP Act protective or punitive?  The next 
section critically analyzes the PCHIP Act by comparing the provisions offered under the 
Act to provisions under the Criminal Code and the Child, Youth and Family 
Enhancement Act.  I also critique the PCHIP Act itself by dissecting particular sections 
of the Act.  
 
4.2 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PCHIP ACT 
Supporters of the PCHIP Act contend that the law protects children from prostitution by 
punishing those who exploit them.  If this is true, then the penalties for ‘pimps’ and 
‘johns’ outlined in the PCHIP Act should be ‘on par’ with penalties for sexual offences 
listed in the Criminal Code.  The following investigates whether this is the case by a brief 
comparison between the certain sections of the PCHIP Act and the Criminal Code.  
Following this, the PCHIP Act is compared to the Child, Youth and Family Enhancement 
Act to see if it is as innovative as its proponents contend. 
The Criminal Code contains numerous sections aimed at punishing people who 
facilitate youth prostitution.  Section 212(1) prohibits procuring, or attempting to procure 
anyone for prostitution, with a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment.  Section 
212(2) states that living on the avails of a prostitute who is under the age of 18 is liable to 
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a minimum of two years, and maximum of fourteen years imprisonment.  Further, 
Section 212 (2.1) creates the offence of aggravated procuring.  It states that those who 
live on the avails of an underage (under 18) prostitute, and compels the person to engage 
in prostitution, and/or threatens or attempts to use violence, intimidation or coercion to 
force a person in prostitution, is liable for an imprisonment term between five to fourteen 
years.  Other relevant sections include those classified as ‘Sexual Offences,’ such as 
Sections 151 (sexual interference)42, 152 (invitation to sexual touching)43, 153 (sexual 
exploitation)44, and 170 (parent or guardian procuring sexual activity)45.  This lengthy list 
of offences demonstrates that a plethora of legislation aimed at sexual exploiters existed 
before the PCHIP Act was passed46.   
Compare the offences listed above to Section 9 of the PCHIP Act, which states 
that any person who causes a child to be in need of protection, or interferes with a 
director or police officer attempting to enforce the Act, is guilty of an offence and is 
liable to pay a maximum fine of $25 000 and/or spend up to two years in prison 
(Protection of Children Involved in Prostitution Act, Section 9).  This startling 
discrepancy in penalties demonstrates that the PCHIP Act actually affords less 
consideration and protection to these victims of sexual abuse than comparable offences 
under the Criminal Code.  Apparently, sexually abusing a youth prostitute is not as ‘bad’ 
as sexually abusing a girl who is not a prostitute, if the respective punishments for these 
offences are an indication.  Perhaps just as unsettling as this discrepancy is the fact that 
Section 9 is rarely used to punish exploiters of youth prostitutes.  In 2003, Koshan found 
that no convictions had been reported under this section (2003: 222).  Janis Tarchuk, 
current minister of Alberta Children’s Services, has confirmed that this section has “not 
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been used as regular practice” (personal communication, Nov. 2007).  Apparently, police 
have continued to use existing legislation under the Criminal Code to deal with 
exploiters, if at all.  This shows that Section 9 of the PCHIP Act is impotent in reality, as 
it seems to exist only on paper.    
Like Section 9, Section 6 of the PCHIP Act is targeted at ‘pimps.’  Section 6 
allows the director of the protective safehouse, the youth, or the youth’s guardian to apply 
for a restraining order against anyone who has abused her or caused her to become 
involved in prostitution (Protection of Children Involved in Prostitution Act, Section 6).  
However, this option is open to individuals beyond the PCHIP Act.  For example, Section 
30 of the Child, Youth, and Family Enhancement Act allows authorities to obtain 
restraining orders against a person who is “likely to physically or emotionally injure or 
sexually abuse the child or has encouraged or is likely to encourage the child to engage in 
prostitution” (Enhancement Act Policy Manual, 2007: 301).  There is clearly an overlap 
between these provisions.  Like Section 9, this section of the PCHIP Act exists only on 
paper.  As of July 31, 2001, Section 6 had not been used (Koshan, 2003: 222).  Tarchuk 
confirmed that requests for restraining orders were rare, stating “often protective services 
alone provide for the safety needs of the child thereby decreasing the need for a 
Restraining Order” (personal communication, Nov. 2007).    
The discrepancies and redundancy evident in Sections 6 and 9 demonstrate a gap 
between the stated intentions and practical reality of the Act.  According to a 2004 
Alberta Children’s Services document, the PCHIP Act is based on several principles, one 
being the idea that perpetrators of child sexual abuse (including ‘johns’ and ‘pimps’) 
must be held legally responsible for their actions (2004: 5).  Because Sections 6 and 9 
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have not been used, and merely re-state already existing legislation, it is rational to 
conclude that the PCHIP Act is not essentially about punishing ‘pimps’ or ‘johns,’ 
contrary to its stated objectives47.  Rather, the PCHIP Act is essentially about the 
confinement and regulation of youth prostitutes (see Koshan, 2003).   
The essence of the PCHIP Act is revealed when we consider that the confinement 
of youth prostitutes is only one of three options available to authorities upon 
apprehending a youth (see Protection of Children Involved in Prostitution Act, Section 3).  
The first option listed is to return the child to their guardian or to a responsible adult.  
However, if a child does not have a guardian, this option is simply not available to them.  
This negatively affects youth who are involved in the child welfare system, as these 
youth may not have parents or any adults who care for them.  The second option is to 
release the child, if the following two conditions are filled: the child is 16 years or older, 
and the child is “capable of providing for the child’s own needs and safety” (PCHIP Act, 
Section 3.1.b(iii)).  This condition is puzzling, for the child may be capable of providing 
for their own monetary needs specifically by engaging in prostitution.  Perhaps this 
option exists for authorities who believe that the youth is beyond help (too entrenched), 
or for youth who do not fit in with the authorities’ stereotype of which youth should be 
detained.  The third option is to confine the child in a protective safehouse.  The wide 
variety in options available to authorities demonstrates the arbitrariness of the Act.  Some 
youth are detained for engaging in prostitution, while others are left on the streets, and 
others are simply returned to their parents.  This discrepancy in responses is difficult to 
justify, considering that the liberty and freedom of these youth are at stake.    
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To properly characterize the PCHIP Act, one must also consider the ‘secure 
services’ offered under the Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act.  This Act states 
that any child can be issued a ‘secure services certificate’ if they are “in a condition 
presenting an immediate danger to the child or others,” “if it is necessary to confine the 
child in order to stabilize and assess the child,” and “less intrusive measures are not 
adequate to sufficiently reduce the danger” (Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, 
2007: Section 43.1(d-f)).  Under this section, a child can be confined in a locked facility 
from 3 to 20 days.  The rather broad mandate of section 43 would surely include youth 
who are involved in prostitution48.  Since the option of secure services was available to 
authorities prior to the passing of the PCHIP Act, it is unclear what the PCHIP Act added 
to existing legislation.   
 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
The secure services provision of the Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, 
along with the long list of relevant Criminal Code sections demonstrates the redundancy 
of the PCHIP Act.  The non-use of some sections, coupled with the over-use of the 
confinement option for youth, betray the essence of the PCHIP Act.  In reality, this 
legislation functions to detain and regulate youth prostitutes, not protect them.  This over-
confinement of youth is a manifestation of the attitudes shared among agents in the fields 
of child welfare and youth criminal justice.  Those with the power to decide how a youth 
suspected of prostitution should be handled are likely to favour a disciplinary rather than 
voluntary option.   
 66
My critical position vis-à-vis the PCHIP Act is shared by Busby et al. (2002) and 
Koshan (2003).  Though these authors have made important contributions to our 
understanding of the PCHIP Act, additional investigation into the PCHIP Act is 
warranted to understand how and why the PCHIP Act was passed, and how it operates.  
The application of Bourdieu’s concepts of field and habitus to the PCHIP Act allows one 
to address these issues within the context of the juridical field.  It is to this analysis we 
now turn. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LAW AND POLITICS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE JURIDICAL 
AND POLITICAL FIELDS 
[W]e must take into account the totality of objective relations between the juridical field 
and the field of power and, through it, the whole social field.  The means, the ends, and 
the specific effects particular to juridical action are defined within this universe of 
relations. Bourdieu (1987a: 841, original italics). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the juridical field49 is Bourdieu’s alternative to two 
antagonistic ideologies in theories of law: the instrumentalist position which views law as 
a direct reflection of existing power relationships, as dictated by dominant groups, and 
the formalist viewpoint which conceives of the law as an autonomous, independent, 
closed system, unaffected by other fields (Bourdieu, 1987a).  Bourdieu contends that both 
positions ignore the existence of a social universe, the juridical field, “disciplinarily and 
professionally defined” and an “area of socially patterned activity or practice” (Terdiman, 
1987: 805).  To understand the ‘social significance of the law,’ we must analyze law 
within the context of the juridical field, which is “relatively independent of external 
determinations and pressures” (Bourdieu, 1987a: 816, emphasis added).  At the same 
time, Bourdieu hastens to add that the juridical field is less autonomous than other fields 
(see endnote 3, Chapter 2, page 10).    
 In this chapter Bourdieu’s theoretical and methodological insights are utilized in 
order to investigate the relationship between politics and law and to provide an 
understanding of the PCHIP Act that goes beyond simple functional explanations.  The 
relationship between politics and law is addressed by examining the constitutional 
challenge to the PCHIP Act which occurred in November of 1999.  In doing so, the 
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degree of external political determinations on the juridical field is addressed.  Further, the 
position of the juridical field vis-à-vis the field of politics and power is analyzed.  An 
assessment of the external determinations and the competition within the legal field for 
the right to determine law is constructed (see Wacquant, 1989: 40).  Moreover, the extent 
to which the relationship between the fields of power and law informs the relationship 
between child welfare and youth criminal justice legislation is investigated. 
 This chapter delves into Constitutional law.  As such, it is necessary to outline 
constitutional norms which inform cases.  In Canada, constitutional law deals with 
problems of intergovernmental relations, for instance, issues which arise between the 
federal and provincial levels of power regarding legislation.  According to Waddams 
(1992), the Supreme Court of Canada is the final arbiter of powers held by the federal 
and provincial levels of government.  As a federal state, governmental power in Canada 
is divided between central and provincial authorities.  As such, every individual is subject 
to both provincial and federal laws (Hogg, 2005).  These two sources of authority 
occasionally overlap.  Where this occurs, the federal power prevails (Hogg, 2005).   
 The designation of criminal law under federal jurisdiction occurred after much 
debate over the terms for a united Canada during the drafting of the Constitution.  It was 
decided that the federal government would be responsible for criminal law and ‘Peace, 
Order, and Good Government’ (the POGG powers).  (Bakan et al., 2003: 81).  Some 
authority over criminal matters has been transferred from federal to provincial 
jurisdiction.   
 The pith and substance of a particular legislative Act must be determined in cases 
where it is charged that the Act is ultra vires.50  Pith and substance is a legal doctrine in 
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Canadian constitutional interpretation used to determine under which head of power a 
given piece of legislation falls.  A pith and substance analysis discovers the purpose of 
the law and the practical effects of the law.  Practical effects include unanticipated effects 
arising from discriminatory enforcement and imperfect administration (Magnet, 2002).  
Legislation which appears valid may be found invalid if “its essential object and effect is 
to deal with some matter beyond the jurisdiction of the enacting Legislature” (Strayer, 
1983: 63).  If a piece of legislation is found to be unconstitutional, legislators can subject 
this finding to ‘judicial review.’  Judicial review gives power to courts to decide “whether 
action taken by a governmental body or legal actor […] is or is not in compliance with 
our Constitution, and, if they find that it is not, to declare it to be unconstitutional” 
(Bakan et al., 2003: 29).   
 Some may contend that the events surrounding the constitutional challenge can be 
explained simply through reference to these constitutional norms.  However, this 
perspective, which represents a normative or formal approach to the law, ignores the 
critical element of power in these exchanges (see Chapter 1).  For instance, judges who 
perform judicial reviews are supposed to be isolated from political influence.  However, 
these judges are not representative of the general population.  As Hogg notes, “they are 
recruited exclusively from the small class of successful, middle-aged lawyers” (2005: 
131).  Bakan adds:  
 (J)udges, because of their education, socialization, and the processes through 
 which they are appointed, tend to stay within the bounds of conservative 
 discourses, about work, family, sexuality, race, and other social phenomena, when 
 deciding Charter cases (1997: 5).   
    
Further, choices about constitutionality made by judges cannot be wholly explained by 
precedent.  According to Hogg (2005), even if courts appear to operate according to ‘a 
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strict and complete legalism,’ outside forces influence decisions.  For example, laissez 
faire economic theories affected the decisions of Canadian courts in striking down 
legislation (intended to relieve farmers from debt) enacted by Western provinces during 
the 1930s depression (Hogg: 2005).  The effect of political motivations on the passing of 
the PCHIP Act will be shown to be another example of outside forces influencing 
legislation.   
 Bourdieu et al. argues that juridical writings “take their full meaning not only as 
theoretical contributions to the knowledge of the state but also as political strategies 
aimed at imposing a particular vision of the state” (1994: 3).  Thus, to access the ‘full 
meaning’ of judges’ written reasons analyzed below, the power struggle between the 
legal and political fields must be taken into account.   
The power struggle was heightened in 1982 with the passing of the Charter.  As 
stated in Chapter three, the passing of the Charter had important implications for both 
child welfare and justice practices, as constitutional challenges against legislation became 
possible.  Specifically, courts would be given a new role in overseeing the legality of 
government action (Bakan et al., 2003: 7).  Denying government the power to do 
something it wants to do brings courts into the scope of political controversy (Hogg, 
2005), which was not as much of an issue prior to the passing of the Charter.   
 This task is approached by an ‘outsider’ of the legal field.  Bakan (1997) argues 
for the legitimacy of this approach.  Drawing on Weber, he argues that the ‘internal’ 
perspective is deficient as it allows only for normative inquiries regarding the legal 
system.  As such, knowledge generated about law from this approach is detached from 
economic factors (Bakan, 1997: 5).  Understanding the law fully requires analysis from a 
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standpoint beyond the legal system (1997: 5).  He notes “internal legal thought is 
rigorous, […] but it implicitly defends a method that presumes, rather than questions, 
law’s autonomy from politics and society” (Bakan, 1997: 6).     
 
5.1 CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
The passing of the PCHIP Act in February, 1999 was followed by a constitutional 
challenge which was heard by Judge Karen Jordan on November 15, 1999, and continued 
on April 6, 2000.  The challenge regarded the detention of two seventeen year old 
Calgary girls, who were detained on September 13, 1999.  While looking for stolen 
property, police entered a residence which was dirty and unkempt.  According to hearsay 
evidence, drug paraphernalia, mattresses, and condoms were strewn about (Alberta 
(Director of Child Welfare) v. K.B., ABQB, 2000, paragraph 9).  The officers deemed the 
residence a ‘trick pad,’ apprehended the girls, and placed them at a ‘protective 
safehouse.’  Two days after the apprehension, the girls were brought before the 
Provincial Court of Alberta for the ‘show cause’ hearing.  During this hearing, the 
defence counsel (Harry Van Harten and Bina S. Border) issued notice that they would 
seek application investigating the constitutional validity of the Act.   
 The girls’ lawyers argued that the PCHIP Act violated sections 751, 852, 953, 
10(b)54 and 10(c)55 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Counsel for the 
youth also argued that the pith and substance of the PCHIP Act was criminal legislation.  
Thus, it was contended that the Act was ultra vires the Province of Alberta.  On July 28, 
2000, Judge Jordan ruled that the PCHIP Act contradicted sections 7, 8, and 9 of the 
Charter.  Further, she found that none of these violations were saved by section 1, which 
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“guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” 
(Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 1).   
According to Judge Jordan, section 7 of the Charter was violated because many 
children who are detained under the legislation are not given the opportunity to challenge 
the allegations made against them, resulting in a deprivation of their liberty.  Section 8 
was violated because the Act provided for warrantless searches which are not subject to 
judicial examination, and section 9 was contradicted because children are subject to 
apprehension and confinement without the opportunity to have this action judicially 
scrutinized (Alberta v K.B., 2000 ABPC, paragraphs 5, 7, and 8).  Jordan noted the lack 
of procedural steps: 
The procedure in the Act is not fair…It is the lack of a procedural system which 
would allow each and every one of the children to appear before a judge, with the 
assistance of counsel, to participate in an adversarial process where they can 
challenge the Director’s evidence and present their own evidence (Alberta v. K. 
B., 2000 ABPC 113, paragraphs 56 and 57).  
 
Besides ruling on the constitutionality of the Act, Judge Jordan investigated 
whether the Act was ultra vires the legislature of Alberta.  It was charged, by counsel for 
the applicants, that the pith and substance of the legislation was criminal, and therefore 
not within the legislative domain of the Provincial Parliament.  Judge Jordan stated: 
In order to determine the pith and substance of any particular legislative provision 
it is necessary to examine that provision in its overall legislative context and to 
identify the dominant or most important characteristic of the challenged law 
(Alberta v. K.B., 2000 ABPC 113, paragraph 24).   
 
Judge Jordan disagreed with the applicant’s counsel that the Act was a “colorable attempt 
to legislate in the field of criminal law” (Alberta v. K.B., 2000 ABPC 113, paragraph 25).  
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She argued that the apprehension and detention of children under the PCHIP Act did not 
automatically mean that the Act invaded the domain of criminal law, stating:  
If the only reason for trying to eradicate this activity were moral, it would follow 
that legislation directed at this purpose would be criminal law…There are, 
however, valid reasons for trying to eliminate prostitution in which children are 
involved which are not based in morality.  Prostitution is a dangerous enterprise; 
female participants, whether children or adult, are subject to serious harm and 
even death at the hands of both pimps and johns.  Alcoholism and drug addiction 
are widespread within the trade.  The risk of sexually transmitted disease is so 
high as to be a significant public health risk (Alberta v. K.B., 2000 ABPC). 
 
This position completely ignores and sidesteps the history of prostitution 
legislation, which was overtly about morality (see Chapter 3).  Further, as argued in 
Chapter 4, the dominant feature of the PCHIP Act is not the protection of children.  If this 
Act were truly designed to protect children from danger, then the sections of the PCHIP 
Act meant to punish those who exploit youth prostitutes would be utilized at least as 
often as the sections which allow the youths’ detainment. 
Judge Jordan made several questionable comparisons when characterizing the 
PCHIP Act.  For instance, she equates the confinement of youth prostitutes for their own 
protection from sexual abuse to the apprehension of youth who are being abused by their 
parents.  This equation implies that the confinement of youth in protective safehouses is 
‘on par’ with how other abused youth are treated, and so the PCHIP Act is within the 
realm of child welfare legislation.  However, she ignores the fact that youth abused by 
their parents are not detained, while youth sexually abused through prostitution are 
detained.  Thus, these situations are not at all comparable56.  Despite these problems, 
Jordan stated:    
I am satisfied that the pith and substance of the Protection of Children Involved in 
Prostitution Act is the protection of children from the sexual abuse and other risks 
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inherent in the sex trade.  It does not invade the domain of the criminal law 
(Alberta v. K.B., 2000 ABPC 113, paragraph 41).   
 
As I argued above, the ‘pith and substance’ of the Act is not the protection of the 
children.  Jordan’s decision regarding pith and substance was based on a reading of the 
PCHIP Act itself, as well as testimony given by Sharon Heron, a member of the Task 
Force on Children Involved in Prostitution which recommended the PCHIP Act.  The 
PCHIP Act states that the aim of the legislation is to protect children involved in 
prostitution, and contains sections which permit the punishment of exploiters.  However, 
the fact that the sections pertaining to pimps are not used did not enter into her reasoning.  
This illustrates a problem with sections which exist only on paper, and also testifies to the 
power inherent in codified law.  Though Sections 6 and 9 are rarely enforced, they are, 
nonetheless, powerful rhetorical devices which function to make the Act appear 
protective.  The result of this codification is that the PCHIP Act can defensibly be 
conceived as child welfare legislation.   
 The reliance on Heron’s testimony points to another problem.  Heron was a 
member of the Task Force which recommended the creation of the PCHIP Act.  Not 
surprisingly, Heron testified that the PCHIP Act was based on principles such as: 
“children involved in prostitution are victims of sexual abuse and require support, not 
punishment” (Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) v. K.B., 2000 ABQB, paragraph 46).  
This is exactly the position expected of a Task Force member.  Had other positions been 
represented, for example, those of youth detained under the Act, or front line workers at 
the safe houses, the pith and substance of the Act may have been determined to be 
something other than protection.   
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 The type of evidence heard during the case above is the responsibility of the 
crown and the lawyers for the youth, not the judge.  Because it is difficult to bring forth 
an argument that a law is discriminatory on the grounds of both gender and race, the 
possible violation of Section 1557 of the Charter was not considered.  Koshan (2003) has 
probed into this issue further, by assessing the three stages of the test for equality right 
claims, which are stated in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration 
(1999)58.  The first stage, ‘differential treatment,’ particularly demonstrates the hurdles in 
successfully bringing forth such a challenge under Section 1559.   
 ‘Differential treatment’ involves a comparative inquiry, “in which the claimant’s 
treatment under the law must be assessed with reference to other groups” (Koshan, 2003: 
234).  Though the state has chosen to subject youth involved in prostitution to protective 
confinement through the PCHIP Act, other youth who might be in need of protection for 
reasons other than prostitution, for instance, homeless youth and/or those with addictions, 
are not confined.  Further, the PCHIP Act disproportionately affects young women and 
Aboriginal youth (Koshan, 2003).  Thus, the effect of the legislation is to impose 
coercive measures onto females, Aboriginals, and those who are socially and 
economically marginalized (Koshan, 2003).   
 Despite these obvious effects, there are boundaries in overcoming this first stage 
of the test.  In particular, there is the “difficulty in identifying the intersections of the 
multiple grounds of discrimination at play” (Koshan, 2003: 239).  Koshan notes,  
 [I]f a young Aboriginal girl from a background of poverty were to challenge the 
 PCHIP, it would be important to recognize the impact of forced confinement in 
 terms of her age, race, gender, poverty, and the intersection of these grounds 
 (2003: 237).   
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These multiple grounds for discrimination (gender, age, race, and poverty) need to be 
addressed together, rather than separately, for a meaningful analysis to occur.  
Unfortunately, the courts are not always willing to look at inequalities in an intersectional 
way.   
 Jordan’s position about the pith and substance reveals the juridical field’s power 
to ‘name’ things.  Bourdieu states, “Law is the quintessential form of the symbolic power 
of naming that creates the things named, and creates social groups in particular” (1987a: 
838).  All legal actors, including lawyers and judges, share in this power of naming.  
Those with first-hand knowledge of youth prostitution, for instance, the youth prostitutes 
themselves, have no power whatsoever in naming.  These performative utterances are, to 
Bourdieu, ‘magical acts’ which succeed simply by virtue of belonging to the juridical 
field (1987a: 838).   
Diagram 5.1 provides a pictorial account of the positions taken in this stage of the  
constitutional challenge.  The Provincial Court of Alberta, comprising the juridical field, 
is within the field of politics or power.  However, the bold outline of the juridical field 
indicates the relative power held by the juridical field at this stage.  The dominant player 
is Judge Jordan, who challenges the political field by deeming the PCHIP Act 
unconstitutional.  Though the youths’ counsel does attempt to gain some power by 
putting forth arguments, their power is relatively less than the power returned by Judge 
Jordan.  Notice that the youth are subject to the power of their counsel, and also indirectly 
to Judge Jordan’s power.   
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Diagram 5.1 Stage One of Constitutional Challenge 
 
 
5.2 POLITICAL RESPONSE 
The saga of the constitutional challenge does not end here, however.  Judge Jordan’s 
ruling was immediately met with substantial resistance and outright defiance from the 
political field.  In a display of contempt, the Alberta government continued to enforce the 
PCHIP Act, though it had been ruled unconstitutional (Koshan, 2003: 228).  Premier 
Ralph Klein threatened to override the decision by invoking section 33 of the Charter, the 
‘notwithstanding clause’60.  Heather Forsyth, the Calgary MLA who spearheaded the Act, 
responded to Jordan’s ruling in the following statement: “They should take the Charter of 
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Rights and shove it.  I am absolutely sick” (Slobodian and Harris, The Calgary Herald, 
July 30, 2000, as cited in Koshan, 2003: 228).     
Despite political pressure, judges upheld Jordan’s ruling.  In one case involving a 
youth who was apprehended from “an area of Calgary known for prostitution,” Judge 
Nancy A. Flatters ruled that the youth could not be detained under the PCHIP Act, as it 
had been found to be unconstitutional (Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) v. S.P., 2000 
ABPC 133, paragraph 6).  The youth was instead detained under an Apprehension Order 
under the Child Welfare Act.  Flatters noted: 
The assessment and treatment remedies available to the Director for a child such 
 as S.P. under the Child Welfare Act are more comprehensive and of longer 
 duration than those available under the PCHIP Act (Alberta (Director of Child 
 Welfare) v. S.P., 2000 ABPC 133, paragraph 14).  
 
Because of Judge Jordan’s ruling, 11 youth were apprehended under the ‘secure services’ 
provision of the Child Welfare Act rather than the PCHIP Act.  This relates to a point 
made in Chapter 4 – even without the PCHIP Act, authorities have the legislated power to 
apprehend and detain youth deemed to be in need of protection.   
The Alberta government challenged Judge Jordan’s ruling by subjecting it to 
judicial review.  The judicial review was carried out by Justice John Rooke61 of the 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench on December 21, 2000.  Judge Rooke argued that Judge 
Jordan had exceeded her jurisdiction by ruling on matters that were not before her.  He 
stated that section 8 ‘Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure’ did not arise on the facts, since the police were voluntarily let into the apartment 
where the girls were found (Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) v. K.B., ABQB, 2000: 
paragraph 29).  Further, Judge Rooke contended that Judge Jordan, a Provincial Court 
judge, did not have the power to deem legislation unconstitutional.  He stated: 
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[T]he Provincial Court is limited to interpreting or applying the law necessary to 
deal with the issues before it, and cannot grant a formal declaration of invalidity, 
which is a remedy exercisable only by a superior court (Alberta (Director of Child 
Welfare) v. K.B., ABQB, 2000: paragraph 33). 
 
 With regard to section 7 (Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice), Rooke agreed that the two girls were deprived of their liberty.  
However, he was unconvinced that this deprivation of liberty was not in accordance with 
fundamental justice (as required by Section 7 of the Charter).  He stated that a careful 
balancing of the rights of the individual and the interests of society was necessary with 
respect to a Section 7 challenge.  Rooke decided that children’s right to protection took 
priority over their right to liberty (Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) v. K.B., 2000 
ABQB, paragraph 69).  Rooke states, “In the case under consideration, state action was 
undertaken to protect children from these parasites – pimps and “johns” – who abuse and 
exploit these children” (Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) v. K.B., 2000: paragraph 80).  
Similar to Judge Jordan, the fact that the sections which protect children from the 
‘parasites’ are rarely used does not enter into his reasoning.   
 He disagreed with Jordan’s ruling that the PCHIP Act violated Section 9 of the 
Charter, which states: “Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or 
imprisoned” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 9).  Judge Jordan argued 
that this section was contradicted because children are subject to apprehension and 
confinement without the opportunity to have this action judicially scrutinized.  Judge 
Rooke disagreed, arguing that “apprehension and confinement, without prior judicial 
authorization, pursuant to the PCHIP Act does not constitute arbitrary detention” (Alberta 
(Director of Child Welfare) v. K.B., 2000 ABQB, paragraph 91).   
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Rooke further disagreed with Judge Jordan’s comparison between the PCHIP and 
the Criminal Code, quoting an earlier case which states: 
[T]he state’s protective purpose in apprehending a child is clearly distinguishable 
from the state’s punitive purpose in the criminal context […].  These distinctions 
should make courts reluctant to import procedural protections developed in the 
criminal context into the child protection context (Alberta (Director of Child 
Welfare) v. K.B., 2000 ABQB, paragraph 56).   
 
In this contention, Rooke attempts to distinguish the boundary between fields.  He holds 
that the PCHIP Act is valid child welfare legislation - apprehension occurs within child 
welfare for the purposes of protection, and procedures from the criminal justice system 
should not be applicable to the PCHIP Act.  It is interesting that Judge Rooke essentially 
agreed with Judge Jordan – she also concluded that the PCHIP Act was valid child 
welfare legislation.   
Judge Rooke’s overturning of Judge Jordan’s ruling demonstrates the competition 
within the hierarchical legal field for the right to determine law.  Rooke’s superior 
position in the juridical field, which allowed him to overturn Judge Jordan’s ruling, is 
related to the position of the juridical field within the larger field of power or politics.  
Rooke’s review was overtly politically motivated, since it is only the political field which 
can demand such a review62.  Harry Van Harten, counsel for the youth in Alberta v. K. B. 
(2000), speculates that the judicial review was a “publicity fix” to maintain favourable 
media coverage regarding PCHIP (personal communication, Jan. 24, 2008).   
Judge Rooke’s position was supported by Dave Hancock, the Justice Minister.    
Commenting on Judge Jordan’s recommendation that all youth confined under the 
PCHIP Act should have a mandatory review, he stated: “In our view, that takes it way too 
far towards a parallel with criminal legislation.  This is not criminal legislation, this is 
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child welfare legislation” (Calgary Herald, November 22, 2000).  Hancock’s support of 
Rooke’s ruling evidences the confluence of the field of politics/power and the field of 
law.  Forsyth also commented on Rooke’s finding, stating “I was always confident that 
this Act would be upheld constitutionally […] I never stopped believing in this 
legislation, and now, we have the court’s endorsement” (The Alberta Teacher’s 
Association, 2000). 
The production of legislation can be seen as a means of accumulating capital.  
The creation of the PCHIP Act, for instance, benefited Forsyth politically.  She gained a 
reputation for championing children and youth issues, especially child prostitutes.  The 
same month that the legislature introduced initial amendments in 2000, Forsyth was 
appointed Solicitor General of Alberta.  In 2002, she was named a Canadian hero by 
Readers Digest magazine “as a result of her work with children” (Legislative Assembly 
of Alberta: Biography for Mrs. Heather Forsyth).  In addition, she was bestowed the 
Blackfoot name ‘Aahsoikinnah-kaiki,’ which translates as ‘healing woman’ (Legislative 
Assembly of Alberta: Biography for Mrs. Heather Forsyth).  She was appointed the 
Minister of Children’s Services in November of 2004, passing legislation such as the 
Drug Endangered Children Act while Minister.  Forsyth seems to be quite entrepreneurial 
in introducing legislation.   
Diagram 5.2 pictures the relations of power which became apparent immediately 
after the Constitutional challenge.   Compared to Diagram 5.1, the power wielded by the 
field of politics is much more substantial in this phase of the ‘game.’  Powerful political 
players such as Ralph Klein, Dave Hancock and Heather Forsyth display their power 
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through statements made about Jordan’s ruling, and through their subjection of her ruling 
to judicial review.  
 
Diagram 5.2 Stage Two of Constitutional Challenge 
 
The posturing displayed by the players below shows that power was essentially at 
stake in these interactions.  The power of the Provincial Court was demonstrated through 
Judge Jordan’s ruling, but this power was contested by the political field when they 
imposed the judicial review.  The review demonstrates the struggle between the political 
and legal fields for the right to determine law.  The legitimacy of the Alberta government 
was restored when Rooke overturned Jordan’s ruling.  However, this was not a complete 
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restoration, as the Alberta Government amended the PCHIP Act on March 18, 2001.  In 
fact, it was amended before Rooke submitted his ruling.  The decision to amend the 
PCHIP Act demonstrates Bourdieu’s contention that holders of political authority never 
establish a complete monopoly over other fields, including the juridical (Bourdieu, 1989: 
22).   
The PCHIP Act was made even more punitive through the amendments.  Though 
procedural details were improved to fulfill obligations to the Charter, confinement 
periods were lengthened greatly.  While the confinement period was 3 days before the 
challenge, it was extended to 5 days after the amendments were tabled (The Protection of 
Children Involved in Prostitution Amendment Act, 2000).  Furthermore, the amendments 
allowed child welfare authorities to apply for a maximum of two confinement periods of 
21 days each (Protection of Children Involved in Prostitution Amendment Act, 2000).  
Thus, the amendments extended the maximum incarceration period from 3 days to 47 
days.  A news release put out by the Government of Alberta on November 21, 2000 
rationalizes this extension of confinement periods in the following:   
This additional time will enable social workers to stabilize the child, help the 
child break the cycle of abuse and begin the recovery process in a safe and secure 
environment (Government of Alberta, 2000). 
 
Noticeably absent in this political/legal struggle are the young girls incarcerated under the 
Act, though their protection is repeatedly referred to.  The absence of the youths’ position 
is due to their lack of juridical capital and habitus, in particular their inability to converse 
in legal discourse.  Though the youth are, in a sense, in the middle of the ‘game,’ they are 
unqualified to participate due to their ‘outsider’ vision of the case.  The exclusion of the 
youths’ point of view is also due to their inferior status in the regulated universe of the 
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juridical field.  In order to engage in the highly rationalized and regulated struggles in the 
legal field, a high degree of judicial competence is required.  According to Bourdieu, 
those who do not possess this entrance requirement must submit to the ‘power of form,’ 
defined as symbolic violence perpetrated by those who are able to ‘put the law on their 
side’ by virtue of their proper judicial manners (for instance, judges and lawyers) 
(Bourdieu, 1987a: 849-50).   
 How can the lengthening of the confinement period be explained?   Bourdieu 
reminds us that legal battles actually function to share the labour of symbolic domination 
(1987a: 823).  Despite the apparently antagonistic positions between Judge Rooke and 
Judge Jordan, the similarities in their positions must not be overlooked.   Recall that 
neither Rooke nor Jordan contended that the pith and substance of the PCHIP Act was 
anything other than protection (although Jordan did make some statements which 
compromised this position).  This assumption framed both of their rulings, though this 
similarity was obscured by disagreements over Charter violations.   
The constitutional challenge and the review had two important functions.  First, 
these legal manoeuvres tacitly supported the view that the PCHIP Act is essentially about 
the protection of youth prostitutes.  Second, the complete lack of debate over the 
possibility of a section 15(1) violation demonstrates that the over-incarceration of 
Aboriginal girls in the ‘protective safehouses’ was not worthy of notice.  These two 
outcomes gave the Alberta government the ‘go-ahead’ to lengthen confinement periods 
because both courts agreed that the confinement was protective, and the over-
incarceration of Aboriginal girls was a non-issue.   
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5.3 CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of the chapter, I indicated that I would investigate the degree of 
political influence on law.  By looking at the events which surrounded the constitutional 
challenge to the PCHIP Act, I conclude that the influence of the political field on the 
juridical field is substantial.  As demonstrated by the outcome of the constitutional 
challenge, the political field retaliates when actors in the juridical field make decisions 
which undermine the authority of politics.  After the PCHIP Act had been ruled 
unconstitutional within the legal field, politicians demanded a judicial review and 
displayed scorn for the decision (for instance, Forsyth postured through comments 
recorded in newspaper articles).   
The antagonisms between law and politics determine hierarchies within the 
juridical field.  Judge Jordan, who emerged as a powerful figure by striking down the 
PCHIP Act, was reprimanded when her decision was overturned by Rooke, a move 
which was motivated and sanctioned by the political field.  The stake in this conflict 
between the fields of law and politics is the right to determine law.  Those that emerge at 
the top of the hierarchy, for instance, Rooke, are bestowed the power to ‘name’ things.  
Rooke ultimately was given the power to decide if the PCHIP Act was youth criminal 
justice law or child welfare law, and he decided to ‘name’ the PCHIP Act child welfare 
law.  Thus, conflicts between the fields of politics and law determine the hierarchy of 
power in the legal field, which in turn dictate boundary disputes between the fields of 
youth criminal justice and child welfare.  However, the relative autonomy of the law must 
be taken into account.  The events surrounding the constitutional challenge show that the 
political field does not have complete power over the juridical field.  Though Judge 
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Jordan’s ruling was overturned, the Government of Alberta did amend the Act to satisfy 
constitutional requirements.   
These conflicts between and within fields have consequences for particular types 
of youth.  Since the 1960s, Aboriginal youth have come into contact with the fields of 
child welfare and youth criminal justice at a disproportionate rate (see Chapter 3).  
Regarding the PCHIP Act, it is female Aboriginal youth who have been particularly 
targeted.  In the next chapter, I utilize theoretical insights from Valverde and Bourdieu to 
investigate why and how the PCHIP Act has functioned to detain Aboriginal girls.      
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CHAPTER SIX  
HABITUS, COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND THE 
REGULATION OF GENDER AND RACE 
It would be hypocritical or naïve to believe that the law was made for all in the name of 
all; that it would be more prudent to recognize that it was made for the few and that it 
was brought to bear upon others. Foucault (1995: 276). 
 
Though the text of the Protection of Children Involved in Prostitution Act appears to be 
neutral regarding gender and race, these factors clearly influence which youth are 
confined in the protective safehouses.  A 2004 Alberta Children’s Services report reveals 
that clients are overwhelmingly female and Aboriginal.  Only 13 male youth had been 
apprehended between 2001 and 2003, compared to 192 female apprehensions in the same 
time period (Alberta Children’s Services, 2004: 24).  The same report indicates that a 
‘high percentage’ of the clients were Aboriginal, though exact numbers are not presented.  
Koshan found that approximately 30 percent of youth incarcerated are of Aboriginal 
heritage (2003: 222)63.   
In this chapter Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is used to address the 
overrepresentation of Aboriginal girls in the protective safe houses.  Through this 
exercise, the nature of the habitus of the present social field is revealed.  The second 
section traces the impact of historical factors on Aboriginal overrepresentation in sex 
trade.  This section is informed by academic articles and a re-examination of Section 3 of 
the PCHIP Act.  The last section draws on a ‘Notice of Confinement’ document to show 
how gender and race are regulated through the regulation of spaces. 
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6.1 HABITUS AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE 
The habitus of the current social field, from which legislation targeting youth prostitution 
originates, is influenced by racist and sexist assumptions and concrete inequalities64.  
These assumptions take the form of ‘common knowledge,’ which has always had a role 
in the regulation of prostitution.  To investigate the role of gender and race on the PCHIP 
Act, I first provide a theoretical background to frame these issues.   
 In Masculine Domination (2001),65 Bourdieu references the gender-based patterns 
of behaviour among the Kabyle peoples of Algeria.  He points out differences between 
men and women regarding posture, gestures and movements (Bourdieu, 1990a: 70).  Men 
are straight, firm, upright and direct.  Women, in contrast, walk with a stoop, direct their 
gaze downward, and avoid swinging their hips.  They are to ensure that their hair remains 
covered.  “Modesty, restraint, reserve” characterize the “well brought up woman” (1990a: 
70, see also Bourdieu 2001: 27-8).  It is possible to misconstrue Bourdieu’s argument as 
an ‘orientalist’ argument that reinforces western stereotypes as far as gender relations are 
concerned, even though Bourdieu would not agree with such an interpretation.66   
 These gender roles have implications beyond merely physical appearance, for 
“words that refer to body posture evoke virtue and states of mind” (1990a: 70).  Indeed, 
the body is a dimension of the habitus itself:  
The body believes in what it plays at: it weeps if it mimes grief.  It does not 
represent what it performs, it does not memorize the past, it enacts the past, 
bringing it back to life.  What is ‘learned by the body’ is not something that one 
has, like knowledge that can be brandished, but something that one is…the body 
is thus constantly mingled with the knowledge it reproduces, and this knowledge 
never has the objectivity it derived from objectification in writing and the 
consequent freedom with respect to the body (1990a: 73).   
 
Thus, bodies are a fundamental expression of historical structures.  As Fowler observes,  
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(T)he social constructions of masculinity and femininity are actually written on 
the body in the form of facial masks over emotion or controls, bodily stances, 
gaits, postures…the straight man versus the crooked woman, the masculine direct 
gaze versus the female downward gaze (1999: 480).   
 
The sexual division of labour becomes an enduring structure in our social world, 
the “basis of the di-vision of the world, the most solidly established of all collective – that 
is, objective – illusions” (Bourdieu, 1990a: 146).  The division of labour is perpetuated as 
agents are assigned dispositions, practices and properties which are consistent with the 
“principles of di-vision” (1990a: 146).  Bourdieu states: 
These principles, arising from social reality, contribute to the very reality of the 
social order by realizing themselves in bodies, in the form of dispositions which, 
produced by the classifications, give the appearance of a collective foundation to 
classificatory judgments, such as women’s inclination towards ‘humble and easy’ 
tasks or flexible, submissive thinking (1990a: 146). 
 
Thus, the division of labour between the sexes becomes the “foundation of the vision of 
the world, of the way of understanding the world and mentally structuring it” (Krais, 
1993: 159).  Fowler concurs, stating: “the habitus possesses a primordial sexual 
dimension” (1999: 480).   
 The sexual division of labour is naturalized because it is based on the division of 
sexual labour, including the sex act and reproduction.  Thus, this division has a biological 
foundation (Krais, 1993: 161).  The division of labour becomes embodied in the “habits 
of the body…The body cannot be thought of if not as ‘male’ or ‘female’” (1993: 161).  
Krais states: “(T)he division of labour between the genders is not only as deeply rooted in 
the social agent as is possible; it also seems to refer to nothing but ‘nature’” (1993: 161).  
The domination of males is “naturalized in the form of a profound biologization” 
(Fowler, 1999: 479).  Because it is so deeply rooted, gender identity is a profoundly 
important part of an agent’s habitus.  The ‘natural’ appearance of the gendered division 
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of labour obscures the domination of men over women inherent in this division.  
Bourdieu remarks: “the most intolerable conditions of existence can so often appear 
acceptable and even natural” (1998: 1).   
The legal regulation of Aboriginal females is affected by forms of habitus, which 
are based on these deeply-rooted beliefs about gender.  Moreover, habitus, as a system of 
dispositions, includes also assumptions about Aboriginal criminality, deviance, self-
esteem, hyper-sexuality, propensity of drug and alcohol abuse, and their need for state 
intervention/protection.  The Federal government’s regulation of Aboriginal people 
historically demonstrates this habitus.  A recent addition to this set of assumptions is the 
classification of youth prostitutes as victims, not offenders.  Victim discourse came out of 
the numerous initiatives, including the Badgely and Fraser reports, as well as recent Task 
Forces and Working Groups (see Chapter 3).  The eventual passing of the Act into law 
marked an important shift in the political habitus; youth prostitutes were now officially 
(legally) recognized as victims of sexual abuse first and foremost.  The victim ideology 
has also been accepted by recent scholarly articles.  For example, Kingsley and Mark, 
state that “we must also help the wider community understand that commercial sexual 
exploitation is not a lifestyle choice – it is child abuse” (2000: 4).   
  This habitus is not bound to the Alberta political scene.  In England, the 
Safeguarding Children report also assumes that youth prostitutes are victims and not 
offenders.  Joanna Phoenix (2002b) argues:  
The key terms deployed within the document (i.e. ‘children’, ‘sex’, ‘coercion’, 
‘voluntarism’, ‘exploitation’, and most importantly, ‘prostitution’) are little more 
than the ‘common sense’ elements of a discourse of children as victims (2002b: 
76).  
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Drawing on interviews of police, social service workers, and voluntary organization 
workers, Phoenix found that there was: 
Near universal acceptance amongst social services, voluntary organizations and 
the police that youth prostitution is child (sexual) abuse.  Interestingly, many of 
the interviewees struggled to articulate exactly why this might be, treating the 
claim to be self-evidently true (2002b: 78-9). 
 
Thus, the conception of child prostitutes as victims seems to have become firmly 
established in the habitus of those who create legislation aimed at youth prostitution67.  
Though it may seem enlightened, benevolent, or at worst harmless to conceive of these 
youth as victims, the ‘common knowledge’ that these youth are victims justifies punitive 
measures ostensibly aimed at helping them.  The motto becomes ‘help at any cost,’ which 
justifies protective confinement.   
Assumptions about Aboriginal peoples and vice have long framed legislation 
targeted at that particular group.  In her analysis of Canadian liquor laws, Valverde found 
that Ontario liquor inspectors often employed racial assumptions in determining whether 
an Aboriginal person was drunk (2003: 175).  The liquor inspectors’ statements, recorded 
in 2000, reveal their racialized assumptions: 
“Irishmen can get drunk but they become wild and friendly, not in a bad way like 
the Indians.”   
“Indians and halfbreeds can’t handle their liquor.  They go wild.  I used to dread 
dealing with them” (2003: 175).   
 
Valverde argues that “determinations of drunkenness are mediated by prior beliefs about 
ethnicity, occupation, class, and gender” (2003: 176).   
This ‘common knowledge’ also framed legislation prohibiting the selling or 
giving of alcohol to Aboriginal peoples up until the 1951 under the Indian Act.  As 
Valverde notes, “the susceptibility of Indians to drunkenness was ‘obvious;’” there was 
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no need for judges at the time to explain why this protectionist measure was necessary 
(2003: 196).  In court cases where the drunkenness of the Aboriginal was debated, 
Valverde (2002: 203) notes one case where the lawyer opined that Indians always walked 
as though they were drunk, even if sober.  The judge agreed, stating: 
We do know, I think, that Indians – I have seen them at Kamsack [the town] very 
 often – are not particularly upright or soldierly in their bearing unless they have 
 had military service.  They are inclined to slouch along (Richards n. Cote [1962] 
 40 W. W. R. 340 at 344, as cited in Valverde, 2003: 203).   
 
A parallel can be drawn to the PCHIP Act – indeed, the perceived “weakness of 
the will” of Aboriginal peoples continues to shape legal thought today (Valverde, 2003: 
196).  Currently, there is a ‘commonsense’ view that the youth who ‘benefit’ by the Act 
are Aboriginal female; the demographic ‘Aboriginal female’ is connected to prostitution.  
This equation, characteristic of the habitus, is unjustified yet seems to operate 
uncontested.   Similar to the case of alcoholism and Aboriginals, the old colonial 
assumption that Aboriginal peoples are morally weak and vulnerable to vices seems to be 
the unspoken assumption underpinning the PCHIP Act, so ‘commonsense’ that the vast 
overrepresentation of Aboriginal females in the safe houses is unnoticed.  Bourdieu 
states: “[T]hrough habitus, we have a world of common sense, a world that seems self-
evident” (1989: 19).   
The 2004 Alberta Children’s Services report employs common knowledge 
regarding Aboriginal people in its assessment of the protective safe houses.  The report 
acknowledges that a “high percentage of clients of the Edmonton protective safehouse 
was of Aboriginal background,” yet argue that “involvement in prostitution for children 
on Aboriginal reserves was perhaps not being sufficiently addressed” and “the programs 
may be missing some sub-groups: […] those on Aboriginal reserves, for example” 
 93
(Alberta Children’s Services, 2004: 25, 32 and 57).  The report offers no evidence that 
Aboriginal youths are being ‘missed’ by the legislation, other than a ‘feeling’ held by 
stakeholders that this is the case.  I argue that these stakeholders are drawing on a 
common knowledge that Aboriginal female youth are more given to the vice of sexual 
immorality than their non-Aboriginal female counterparts.  Though it is nowhere stated in 
the Act that the target population are Aboriginal females, their over-detainment reveals 
the common knowledge that their need for confinement is self-evident; unquestioned.   
The current dominant habitus is at odds with the habitus embodied by Aboriginal 
female youth.  Their habitus is revealed in Kingsley and Mark (2000), who held 
interviews and consultations with Aboriginal ‘experiential’ youth68.  For example, a 
female youth from Saskatoon stated: 
I grew up…in an abusive home.  My Mom gave up on me when I was 13, and I 
started fixing.  I was constantly being moved from foster home to foster home, 
and I nobody to talk to about anything.  I was never stable; half my foster parents 
were assholes, especially emergency foster care.  I didn’t really know much about 
it, just [what] I had heard from my friends.  The money part of it [the sex trade] 
was in my hands for maybe 15 minutes.  I’d get it and go straight to the dealers 
(as cited in Kingsley and Mark, 2000: 18).   
 
This quote incorporates several aspects of the habitus of Aboriginal females involved in 
the sex trade, including the presence of physical abuse, alcohol and drug use, and 
involvement in the child welfare system.  When working in the protective safe house in 
Edmonton, I witnessed the extent of drug addiction among the youth.  The overwhelming 
majority had addictions issues, many to crystal meth.   
The prevalence of violence is especially significant.  Monture-Angus states: 
It is likely that Aboriginal women experience violence in their lives with greater 
frequency than any other collective of women in Canadian society.  Only one 
form of this violence is physical.  Frequently, Aboriginal women are battered, 
raped, and sexually violated from the time we are only children.  […]  Many 
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Aboriginal women move from the violence of our childhoods – which is often an 
experience of the violence our mothers survived layered over the violence we 
ourselves have survived – to violent relationships with men, including both rape 
and battering.  Violence is not just a mere incident in the lives of Aboriginal 
women.  Violence does not just span a given number of years. It is our lives.  And 
it is in our histories.  For most Aboriginal women, violence has not been 
escapable.  […]  Racism and colonialism are psychological violence with the 
same effects as overt physical violence (Monture-Angus, 1995: 170). 
 
Racism and violence (physical and sexual) profoundly shape the habitus of these 
Aboriginal girls.  McEvoy and Daniluk found that sexual abuse was a ‘serious problem 
within native communities,’ with female children being victimized at greater numbers 
than male children (1995: 2).  Interviews held with Aboriginal women revealed that, as a 
result of their abuse histories, they felt ‘flawed’ in three ways: as abuse survivors, as 
women, and as natives (1995: 4).  Taunts such as “fat squaw’ and “dirty Indian” were 
internalized by the women, causing them feel as though they had no intrinsic worth as 
Aboriginal women (1995: 5).   
 Stereotypes held by front-line workers affected the treatment of the youth 
confined at the protective safe house in Edmonton, which became apparent to me during 
my time as a front-line worker.  There is one particular conversation with a white male 
co-worker which particularly reveals these stereotypes.  The conversation followed a 
meeting, during which we were informed that the system of night-time checks had been 
changed slightly.  Starting at 11:00 pm, the girls are checked by staff, who aim a 
flashlight into their rooms and confirm that the girl is alive and monitor their movement 
periodically throughout the night.  Before the aforementioned meeting, either male or 
female staff could perform these night checks.  However, it was decided that only female 
staff should perform the checks, as there was concern that the girls may not be 
comfortable with a man entering their room during the night.  This decision was met with 
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scorn.  One stated to me that the girls must be pretty comfortable around men, since they 
were prostitutes. 
 Aboriginal youth consulted by Kingsley and Mark reported that white peoples’ 
stereotypes of Aboriginal peoples left them feeling “worthless and undeserving of help” 
(2000: 24).  Kingsley and Mark argue: “Being told all of your life that you are inferior 
because of the colour of your skin shapes your thoughts, your actions, and your sense of 
self-worth” (2000: 24).  Acoose argues that a “misconstrued notion of self” is an 
important factor in Aboriginal women’s drug use and involvement in the sex trade (2007: 
7).  She states:  
 When a woman is continually told she is not worthy, stupid, useless, and nothing 
 but a whore or that being raped is her fault, at some point in time she will begin to 
 believe that she is nothing (2007: 7).   
 
This internalization certainly does not suggest that the outcomes of violence are 
Aboriginal women’s fault.  The work of Acoose (2007) and Kingsley and Mark (2000), 
among others, show how structural and systemic violence have marginalized Aboriginal 
women, forcing them to operate within the confines of this violence.   
 According to Bourdieu, domination presupposes a doxic order, which is shared by 
both the dominated and the dominants (Krais, 2006 and 1993).  The internalization by 
Aboriginal girls of the racist and sexist taunts above indicates that they come to accept 
these labels.  This complicity indicates that symbolic violence is being exercised.  
Bourdieu states that even disadvantaged individuals tend to perceive the world as natural 
and accept their circumstances (1989: 18).   
 I must point out that the girls confined under the PCHIP Act largely do not agree 
with others’ conception of their behaviour, nor do they comply readily with the structure 
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at the protective safe houses.  This shows that the doxic order referred to above is never 
complete or absolute.  I have seen countless exchanges between staff and the youth which 
can be conceived as a “plurality of resistances” (Foucault, 1990: 95-6).  For instance, the 
youth sometimes deny that they are involved in prostitution (which may be true in some 
cases), or may refuse to talk about their involvement.  This behaviour, labelled as 
‘difficult’ by staff, demonstrates the refusal of some youth to accept the doxic order.   
Further, the fact that many youth go AWOL immediately upon release from the 
protective safe house shows that the structure imposed at the safe house (via the strict 
schedule and rules) largely fails to transform the youth into disciplined, docile bodies.  
 
6.2 ABORIGINAL OVERREPRESENTATION IN THE SEX TRADE 
By holding consultations with sexually exploited Aboriginal youth across Canada, 
Kingsley and Mark (2000) found a number of important factors regarding Aboriginal 
overrepresentation in the sex trade.  These factors include fragmentation of culture, lack 
of higher education and job opportunities, poverty, abuse (physical, sexual and 
emotional), lack of role models and elders, substance abuse issues, homelessness, over-
representation in the justice system, racism, gender issues, and low self-esteem (2000: 
12).  Busby et al. found many of the same factors, listing childhood abuse, 
overrepresentation of girls on the street, substance abuse, race issues, and poverty as 
particularly important (2002: 2). 
 Kingsley and Mark (2000) discuss colonialism, poverty and unemployment, abuse 
history, homelessness, gender, and race as particularly important factors.  Regarding 
colonialism, they state: 
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The negative impact of European colonialism on Native peoples and their cultures 
has been a decisive factor in creating and maintaining barriers of social, 
economic, and political inequality…Aboriginal youth are often the direct 
recipients of the pain of racism, residential schooling, forced adoption, and 
cultural fragmentation (2000: 11).  
 
Clearly, Aboriginal youth involved in the sex trade stems in part from colonialist events 
which occurred hundreds of years ago.  The ramifications for Aboriginal youth are 
demonstrated in their overrepresentation in the sex trade.  Razack (2000) reminds us that 
Aboriginal peoples inhabit a state of colonialism which has remained as direct and 
coercive as it was two centuries ago, as evidenced by their high rate of suicides.  
Economic factors including unemployment and poverty are structural factors that 
have affected Aboriginal involvement in the sex trade.  Kingsley and Mark argue that 
unemployment “forces youths into sex trade work” (2000: 14).  When one considers that 
“Aboriginal peoples are the most socio-economically disadvantaged group in Canada” 
(Kingsley and Mark, 2000: 22), this is a predictable outcome.     
 Abuse history is another important factor to consider when investigating 
Aboriginal overrepresentation in the sex trade.  Kingsley and Mark argue that histories of 
abuse are the main predictor of youth entering the sex trade (2000: 53).  Further, they 
argue that abuse suffered by Aboriginal children is contextually different from abuse 
directed at non-Aboriginal children.  They state: 
Isolation, extreme poverty, economic and social deprivation, high rates of 
alcoholism, substance abuse and domestic violence, as well as racism, 
differentially construct the experiences and consequences of abuse on Aboriginal 
youth (2000: 53).   
 
While non-Aboriginal children also face abusive circumstances, they are less likely to 
face all of the factors listed above, and further, they do not encounter racism in addition 
to their abuse.   
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The high frequency of homelessness among the Aboriginal population is another 
important consideration when investigating their overrepresentation in the sex trade.  For 
example, Kingsley and Mark (2000) argue that the “Downtown Eastside of Vancouver” 
and the “West side of Winnipeg” are overrepresented by Aboriginal peoples.  These areas 
attract vulnerable Aboriginal youth searching for a way to survive (2000: 20).  According 
to Kingsley and Mark, running away from home is a main predictor of involvement in the 
sex trade.  Though these youth may had not planned on working the in sex trade, they 
may have been forced out of an intolerable home environment (Kingsley and Mark, 2000: 
34).   
 
6.3 STRUCTURAL ISSUES WITH THE PCHIP ACT  
The structure of the PCHIP Act functions to confine Aboriginal females at a 
disproportionate rate.  As outlined in chapter four, there are three options open to police 
upon the apprehension of a youth suspected of being involved in prostitution.  These 
options lead to the consequence of Aboriginal girls being detained at greater numbers 
than their non-Aboriginal girls, or males of any race.   
Recall that the first option is to “return the child to the custody of the child’s 
guardian or to an adult who in the opinion of the director is a responsible adult who has 
care and control of the child” (Protection of Children Involved in Prostitution Act, 
Section 3 (1) b (i), 1999), in other words, bring the youth home to a parent or guardian.  
Obviously, this option is not open for homeless youth, since they are without a home or 
guardian.  This is also not an option for youth who have run away from child welfare 
placements.  Because Aboriginal youth are overrepresented among the homeless 
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population (see Kingsley and Mark, 2000: 20), as well as in the child welfare system, 
they are more likely to end up in a protective safehouse than white youth.   
 The second option available to authorities who apprehend youth under PCHIP is 
relevant to the impact of gender on incarceration in the ‘protective safe houses.’  Section 
3 (1) b (iii) provides for the release of the child,  “if the child has attained the age of 16 
years and in the opinion of the director the child is capable of providing for the child’s 
own needs and safety” (Protection of Children Involved in Prostitution Act 1999).  In 
Chapter four, it is pointed out that this provision seems to allow the kind of activity the 
Act ostensibly attempts to suppress- prostitution.  However, there is a second problem 
with this section.  According to common gender stereotypes, males are better able to take 
care of themselves on the street.  Females, the ‘gentler sex,’ require protection from the 
vulgarities of the street.  This stereotype helps to explain the overrepresentation of 
females held at the ‘protective safehouses.’   
 Taken together, these two options are key to the over-confinement of Aboriginal 
females in the ‘protective safehouses.’  By virtue of their overrepresentation on the streets 
(a manifestation of factors including racism, poverty, and abuse histories), as well as their 
‘vulnerable’ gender, they fit into our ‘common knowledge’ assumptions about which 
youth should be confined.    
My contention above is supported by findings of other research.  Joanna Phoenix 
(2002b) found that the ‘common knowledge’ (or habitus) held by police and voluntary 
organization workers about male versus female youth prostitution directed different 
responses for male versus female youths.  One voluntary organization worker stated that 
the issues faced by male and female youth prostitutes differ.  For males, prostitution was 
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linked to issues of sexuality, while female prostitution involved vulnerability (Voluntary 
organization worker, as cited in Phoenix, 2002b: 82).  A police officer drew a boundary 
between male and female youth prostitutes according to the perceived level of violence 
associated with the work.  The officer states:  
For the girls, there is a significant amount of violence all around them, whereas 
for the men, that kind of fabric of violence around them doesn’t seem to be there, 
they’re just isolated and even when they’re working together.  [pause] I mean it’s 
poverty driven in the same way for the girls and boys, but the girls are more 
vulnerable.  It’s more risky for them (Police, as cited in Phoenix, 2002b: 82).   
 
The statements made by the police officer and voluntary organization worker reveal that 
common knowledges regarding male and female sexuality, vulnerability to violence, and 
risk frame justifications for policy.  Because girls are seen as more vulnerable and more 
‘risky’ than males, their protective confinement is justified.      
I add that the racism in Canadian society is evident of a habitus which supports 
and reinforces these beliefs.  The ‘common knowledge’ held by legislators (politicians, 
judges, lawyers, etc.), criminal justice workers (police and prison guards), and social 
service providers (social workers, front line workers in ‘care’ facilities) shapes and 
perpetuates these racist beliefs, and also the sexist beliefs briefly discussed above.  I will 
address these aspects more fully in the next section.   
 
6.4 REGULATION OF GENDER AND RACE  
The regulation of space is also a regulation of gender and race roles.  In his analysis of 
the Kabyle peoples of Algeria, Bourdieu draws a distinction between male and female 
space.  Men occupy the “assembly place, the market or the fields,” while women occupy 
the “house and the garden” (1990a: 76).  It is assumed that certain parts of cities are not 
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proper places for young females, and the entering of male space is indicative of gender 
role defiance.     
 Sherene Razack (2000) has investigated issues surrounding race, space and the 
law.  In her analysis of the murder of Pamela George,69 she argues that the grave injustice 
committed against this Aboriginal woman was diminished through beliefs about space 
and the Aboriginal body.  As George worked occasionally as a prostitute, it was assumed 
that she belonged to a space in which violence is a regular feature.  In this case, this 
geographical space denotes the slum area of Regina, known as the Stroll, which police 
describe as a world of drugs and prostitution.  The assumption that George belonged to 
this space, along with the assumption that her body was routinely violated, downplayed 
the seriousness of her assault and murder (Razack, 2000).   In other words, no one could 
be held accountable for her death, since she was of the Stroll, Aboriginal, and engaging in 
prostitution (Razack, 2000).  In the trial process, race and gender issues were deliberately 
excluded as evidence, as these would contaminate the “pure processes of law” (Razack, 
2000: 128).   
 The regulation of prostitution has historically also been the regulation of gender 
and race, and the PCHIP Act is not an exception.  Hunt, in his research on early twentieth 
century vice commissions and social surveys, concluded that these reports should be 
“read as discourses about the regulation of hetersocial space” (2002: 2).  Hetersocial 
space refers to  
 the shifting and changing sites where young women and men come into contact 
 and where transactions with potentially sexual dimensions mat arise or which 
 others may define in sexualized terms (Hunt, 2002: 2).   
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Hunt argues that space has a temporal dimension in addition to the spatial.  The same city 
street corner may be more charged heterosocially in the dark than in the daylight.  
Attempting to govern heterosocial contact was the major aim of American vice reports 
and Canadian social surveys during the early twentieth century (Hunt, 2002: 1). 
 Like these early vice reports, the PCHIP Act attempts to coerce ‘appropriate’ 
gender and race roles through the regulation of space.  This is evidenced by the following 
document, a ‘Notice to Child’ which is given to the youth upon their detention in a 
protective safe house.  This particular ‘Notice to Child’ document was served to a female 
Aboriginal youth: 
You have been confined in a protective safe house because you were engaging or 
attempting to engage in prostitution.  A director authorized your confinement 
because:  You associate with known pimps and prostitutes and identify your 
boyfriend as [boyfriend’s name] who is known to PChIP as a pimp and recruiter 
of under-age prostitutes as well as a drug dealer.  You have a chronic history of 
AWOL behaviour, leaving your placement and returning at early morning hours 
in cabs or vans.  You choose to hang around the Clareview area where [boyfriend] 
lives and state you like this area as you enjoy hanging around with “Lebs” and 
“Blacks” because they are, according to you, “hot and tough.”  You are believed 
to be engaging in prostitution at this time (Alberta Children’s Services, Notice to 
Child Document).   
 
The first two sentences of these documents are always the same, and the remainder 
informs the girl why she is being confined.  Notice that there is no direct evidence that 
this girl was actually engaging in prostitution.  There was no witness who saw 
prostitution occurring.  The reasons for confinement given above include the girl’s 
association with certain men and her occupation of various spaces (the Clareview area, 
cabs, vans, and unspecified areas beyond the home).  The lack of any concrete evidence 
implies that the reputation of the girl is likely a factor, though this is not explicitly stated.   
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 Hunt notes that the regulation of prostitution has often targeted behaviour which 
is seen as inappropriate for women, even if this behaviour does not include prostitution 
specifically.  Simply being at the wrong place at the wrong time may warrant suspicion, 
such as being on the streets late at night (Hunt, 2002: 5).  These temporal and spatial 
dimensions clearly play a role with consideration of the youth who received the notice 
above.  The charge of ‘chronic history of AWOL behaviour’ sends the message that this 
girl consistently defies the appropriate ‘place’ for young girls, which is safe at home 
under domestic surveillance.  Furthermore, she returns home in the early morning, which 
implies that she has been out all night.  What is implied here is a connection between 
being away from home at night and immoral sexual activity.  The accusation that the girl 
associates with ‘known pimps’ hearkens back to vice commission reports, which viewed 
“female familiarity with casual male acquaintances as tantamount to occasional 
prostitution” (Hunt, 2002: 17).   
 The document contains the assumption that riding around in cabs and vans is 
indicative of illicit sexual activity.  Hunt notes that the automobile has aroused concern 
among moral reformers since their invention, as they allowed couples to escape the 
immediate scrutiny of surveillance, both official and unofficial (2002: 23).  Finally, the 
girl’s choice to ‘hang around the Clareview area,’ and her admission that she likes this 
area, are apparently punishable.  According to Razack, the geography of cities 
demarcates respectable ‘white’ areas from racialized slum areas where all that is not 
respectable is contained (2000: 97).  Though ‘hanging out in the Clareview area’ has 
nothing to do with prostitution per se, it is implied that this defiance of ‘appropriate’ 
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gender behaviour must indicate that she is involved in prostitution, or ‘at-risk’ of 
becoming involved.   
In her research on adolescent ‘troublesome girls,’ Hudson (2002) found that 
certain areas of cities were viewed by police as ‘criminogenic.’  These areas were 
characterized by a high Afro-Caribbean population.  Hudson suggests that “the level of 
police (and possibly social work) control may increase according to the social 
composition and ‘reputation’ of the neighbourhood” (Hudson, 2002: 301).  The 
Clareview area in Edmonton is also considered a ‘criminogenic’ site.  Simply being in 
this area may result in detention, as the ‘Notice to Child’ document demonstrates.   
The culpability of the female is supported by racialized assumptions about the 
males with whom she is keeping company.  It is assumed that it is inappropriate for the 
girl to ‘hang around Lebs and Blacks,’ and her interaction with them puts her at risk of 
victimization.  The ethnicity of the males is apparently important in determining that the 
girl was ‘engaging or attempting to engage in prostitution,’ or else it would not be 
mentioned in the document.  Consider the ineffectiveness of these statements if the ‘Lebs 
and Blacks’ were replaced with ‘whites.’  The document would then read: ‘you enjoy 
hanging around with “whites” because they are, according to you, “hot and tough.”  You 
are believed to be engaging in prostitution at this time.’  There is clearly an assumed 
connection between non-white races and sexual immorality which guides authorities’ 
decisions on which girls ‘require protection.’   
Hudson (2002) came to a similar conclusion regarding racist stereotypes and 
police and welfare practices.  Hudson reports the views of one social worker, who 
commented on a white adolescent female client who had run away from home: “People 
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think that as she had got black boyfriend, she must be promiscuous, she must be on the 
game, or she is being used” (Hudson, 2002: 301).  Hudson argues that people associate 
black men with ‘unrespectable’ sexuality, and thus, interventions aimed at preventing 
girls’ association with these men are viewed as legitimate (2002: 301).   
Though the reputation of the girl is not explicitly addressed in the Notice of 
Confinement document, it is implied through other statements, such as her AWOL history 
and interactions with certain types of men.  The reputation of the girl is often used as 
evidence of sexual promiscuity.  Hudson (2002) found that a girl’s sexual reputation was 
often a determining factor of services received from welfare providers.  She found that 
social workers admitted that their decisions were based on what other people (in 
particular, the police and parents) said about the girl, and once an opinion had been 
formed, the label of ‘promiscuity’ was easily applied (2002: 300).  Once applied, this 
label proved hard to shed.  One social worker stated: “Once (she) had developed a 
‘reputation’ (for sexual activity), it became very easy to say that she was actually 
involved in prostitution” (Hudson, 2002: 300).  Hudson recommends that welfare 
professionals need to seek out actual evidence of girls’ risky behaviour, rather than 
relying on the reputation of the girl held by police and families (Hudson, 2002: 302).   
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
The disproportionate confinement of Aboriginal females by the PCHIP Act is a 
manifestation of a habitus which contains elements of sexism and racism.  The history of 
Aboriginal peoples, along with the structure of the PCHIP Act and the regulation of 
gender and race coincide to over-confine Aboriginal girls in protective safe houses.  The 
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recent reconceptualization of youth prostitutes as victims needs to be challenged if the 
justification of protective confinement is to be delegitimized.  Hudson states:  
A fundamental prerequisite of any attempt to grapple with the complex task of 
evolving alternative policies for girls in trouble (criminal or otherwise) is to 
eradicate the victimology which underpins the status quo (2002 305).   
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
REVIEW OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUDING 
STATEMENTS 
By utilizing Bourdieu’s methodological and theoretical insights, this thesis provides a 
framework appropriate for the investigation of the PCHIP Act.  The concepts of field and 
habitus allow for an understanding of the PCHIP Act which illuminates the dynamic 
relationships within and across different social fields including law and politics.   
 In the introductory chapter, I posed the following question: What is the nature of 
the relationship between law and politics, and between child welfare and youth criminal 
justice legislation?  By utilizing the PCHIP Act as a case study, I have illuminated these 
relationships.  The relationship between law and politics is complex.  The constitutional 
challenge demonstrated that the law is autonomous in some instances.  For example, 
when Judge Jordan was determining the pith and substance of the PCHIP Act, she 
considered only sources which would confirm what the Act itself purported.  This shows 
the inherent self-referential nature of the law, which contributes to its autonomy.  
However, it is not totally autonomous from politics.  On the contrary, the political field 
enacted vengeance onto the juridical field when the latter produced a decision which was 
contrary to political desires.  Ultimately though, these two fields acted in concordance 
with each other in a number of aspects.  There was agreement between these fields 
pertaining the pith and substance of PCHIP, for instance.  The PCHIP case shows that 
law is partially autonomous from politics, yet there is considerable uniformity and 
agreement between these two fields, even as they appear to be conflicting.     
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 The conflicts between law and politics, as demonstrated in the events surrounding 
the constitutional challenge, dictate the hierarchy of power within the legal field.  Those 
legal actors bestowed with power are able to dictate boundary disputes in other fields, for 
instance, the fields of child welfare and youth criminal justice legislation.  The debate 
over the pith and substance of PCHIP was the key struggle between the fields of child 
welfare and youth justice legislation.  Legal actors quickly dismissed notions that the 
detainment of youth, in and of itself, meant that the PCHIP Act was criminal legislation.  
Legal actors concluded that this confinement was indeed protective, and thus squarely 
within the realm of child welfare legislation.  However, this ignores the practical reality 
of the Act.  The fact that an Act which functions to confine youth can be classified as 
child welfare legislation testifies to the blurry boundaries between these fields.  
 Young Aboriginal females are particularly affected in this case.  My second 
research question is: Why are Aboriginal female youth confined by the Act much more 
than other groups of youth?  This is an extremely complicated question, one which surely 
merits additional research.  Historical factors are of utmost importance.  The imposition 
of residential schools and the control of Aboriginal peoples by law since European 
colonization have created a habitus both among the youth who are confined under 
PCHIP, and those who have the power to legislate such Acts.  Attitudes of judges, 
lawyers, and politicians seem to be in tacit agreement over which types of youth ‘should’ 
be confined by the Act, as evidenced by the Alberta government efficacy report, the 
structure of the PCHIP Act itself, and by the complete refusal of legal actors to view the 
over-confinement of Aboriginal girls as a legal issue.      
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7.1 IMPLICATIONS 
The Protection of Children Involved in Prostitution Act was created and justified within 
an era characterized by neo-liberal policies and ideology.  Part of neo-liberalism is the 
privatization and dismantling of the welfare state, with business interests increasingly 
dictating public policy.  These outcomes have had particularly devastating consequences 
for marginalized youth (Schissel, 2006).  Numbers of homeless and disenfranchised 
youth have visibly increased, in part as a by-product of privatization (Martin, 2002: 356).  
Recent legislation attempts to 'clean up' the 'social junk' resulting from these outcomes 
(Pratt, 1999: 149).  Welfare reforms in Alberta have decreased assistance to youth who 
leave their family home, leaving few options available for basic survival.    
 The ineffectiveness of the PCHIP Act to actually help youth prostitutes, coupled 
with its impotence in punishing exploiters, reveal that a 'planned obsolescence'70 is 
foundational to the PCHIP Act.  Recall that the 2004 report by Alberta Children’s 
Services attributes decreasing apprehensions as evidence that Aboriginal youth are not 
being sufficiently targeted, rather than evidence that the Act is fulfilling its objective in 
reducing youth prostitution.  Even the Alberta government does not infer that the PCHIP 
Act is decreasing the number of youth prostitutes.  This planned obsolescence functions 
to fuel the public's demand for more legislation.  Apparently, the remedy for ineffective 
law is more ineffective law.  This ambivalence toward actual outcomes of legislation is 
reflected in constitutional law more generally.  As Judge Jordan states, "there is no 
requirement in Canadian constitutional law that legislation be perfect, or even that it be 
demonstrably effective" (Alberta v. K.B., ABPC, paragraph 38).   
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 The passing and strengthening of the PCHIP Act has been a watershed for other 
legislation aimed at ‘protecting’ youth through incarceration.  For instance, legislators 
made reference to the PCHIP Act during recent debates in the Alberta legislature over the 
Protection of Children Abusing Drugs Act (PCHAD)71, introduced by Red Deer 
backbench MLA Mary Ann Jablonski and the Drug-endangered Children Act (DECA)72, 
introduced by Forsyth.   
 Specifically, the constitutional issues with PCHIP were brought up to suggest that 
provisions be made in the PCHAD legislation to avoid Charter violations (Alberta 
Legislative Assembly, March 21, 2005).  Additionally, some legislators recalled that the 
PCHIP Act did not add anything new to the already existing legislation, and argued that 
the PCHAD and the DECA were similarly unnecessary.  Legislators noted, “all the 
powers that are needed to apprehend children if they are in danger, in fact, exist now.  So 
the purpose of this bill is unclear” and “this to me has the same veneer of window 
dressing, of grandstanding” (Alberta Legislative Assembly, March 9 and 22, 2006).  
Harry Van Harten, counsel for the youth in Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) v. K. B. 
(2000), had discussed this overlap in provisions with Jablonski.  However, his comments 
fell on deaf ears (personal communication, Jan. 24, 2008).   
 Though several MLAs argue and vote against such ‘protectionist’ legislation 
described above, the Alberta government has continued to pass such Bills into law.  For 
example, the Protection of Children Abusing Drugs Act was passed on July 1, 2006, 
despite the assertions made by detractors.  This demonstrates that the Alberta 
government’s prerogative to ‘appear to be doing something’ consistently prevails over 
arguments that already existing legislation is sufficient.  Another recent trend pointed out 
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by legislators is the increase of reactionary, interventionist laws (Alberta Legislative 
Assembly, March 9, 2006)73.  Though these Acts are unsuccessful in actually protecting 
children, they are “flashed around as proof that somehow the government is doing 
something” (Alberta Legislative Assembly, March 22, 2006).   One legislator noted,  
[T]his government is particularly reluctant to have intervention into a number of 
other areas […] and those are things like environmental protection laws or laws 
about restricting business, for example.  There are certain areas where this 
government just will not go, yet I’ve noticed over the years that there’s a 
willingness, almost an eagerness for the state, in this case the provincial 
government, to intervene into people’s homes.  This causes me great concern 
(Alberta Legislative Assembly, March 9, 2006).   
 
The reluctance of the government to intervene with business, yet a simultaneous 
eagerness to intervene into the home and emphasis on punitiveness is indicative of the 
current neo-liberal environment in Alberta.     
In Chapter 5, I argued that the accumulation of capital motivated Forsyth to create 
legislation.  However, empirical evidence would lend support to this stance.  A 
systematic treatment of the field positions identified in this thesis would enrich our 
understanding of the dynamic relationships in the legal and political fields.  Interviews 
with various actors, including youth confined in protective safe houses, staff who work at 
such facilities, social workers, police officers, judges and lawyers, as well as politicians 
involved in the legislative process are necessary to build a fuller empirical understanding 
of these fields.  The lack of such analysis is a limitation of this thesis.  However, such 
future research would benefit from the theoretical framework and critical analysis this 
thesis provides.   
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7.2 TOWARD BETTER POLICY 
Critiquing the PCHIP Act and similar types of discriminatory legislation is unavoidably 
political.  Following Bourdieu’s contention that “social science necessarily takes sides in 
political struggles” (1975: 101), I would like to put forth practical recommendations for 
future legislation which attempts to address the problem of youth prostitution.    
 Any legislation aimed at youth prostitution must be voluntary and offered by non-
government organizations (NGOs).  Youth who have experienced the sex trade, as 
well as adults who used to be involved have told us that these types of 
organizations are much more likely to be utilized by youth prostitutes than state 
mandated services offered through child welfare (see Kingsley and Mark, 2000 
and Busby et al., 2002).  Attempts to force youth to exit the trade should be 
abandoned.  Notwithstanding the ethical problems with coercive confinement, I 
have seen little to no evidence that this method is even effective (or cost effective) 
in helping youth exit prostitution (see Alberta Children’s Services, 2004).   
 The voluntary services offered by NGOs recommended above require staff who 
have personally experienced the sex trade.  As reported by Kingsley and Mark 
(2000), these youth prefer staff who have experienced prostitution, simply 
because they have ‘been there.’  These youth would respond much more 
positively to this staff member than to a staff member who has no idea what their 
life is like.  No amount of reading or research qualifies someone to work as a 
front-line staff with these youth.  Acoose notes “there is a world out there that 
many people will never understand no matter how many books they read or how 
many University degrees they have” (2007: 3).      
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 These recommendations are targeted at a very practical, though somewhat 
superficial level.  The problem is not that these recommendations have not previously 
been published.  On the contrary, Kingsley and Mark (2000), Busby et al. (2002) and 
Koshan (2003) make similar suggestions.  The larger issue is the refusal of legislators (or 
others with the power to create services for youth prostitutes) to seriously consider these 
recommendations and implement them.  In light of this rejection, I contend that any 
legislation which attempts to deal with a problem which plagues a marginalized group 
requires the participation of this marginalized group.  Aboriginal groups were not 
consulted in the legislative process which introduced the PCHIP Act.  Had their views 
been contributed, the Act may have been more suitable to the needs of Aboriginal youth.  
Currently, there is a mismatch between their stated needs (see Kingsely and Mark, 2000) 
and the punitive nature of secure facilities such as PCHIP protective safehouses.   
 On a theoretical level, Bourdieu reminds us that the act of recognizing symbolic 
violence negates its ability to function.  It is far too simplistic and naive to contend that 
merely identifying the PCHIP Act as an example of symbolic violence will lead to its 
repeal.  However, critically analyzing the PCHIP Act does contribute to debate, which at 
the very least destabilizes symbolic violence.  Because these critical analyses do exist, it 
becomes irresponsible for governments to ignore them.  For instance, the 2004 Alberta 
Children’s Services report does at least address critiques of the PCHIP Act, albeit in a 
cursory way.   
 In 1978, British Columbia passed the Heroin Treatment Act, one of the first 
mandatory treatment initiatives in Canada (Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse, 2006).  
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This Act allowed for the confinement of narcotic-addicted individuals for their own 
health.  It was struck down as unconstitutional in 1979, but this was overturned by the 
Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court of British Columbia found that the Act aimed to 
protect the health of individuals addicted to narcotics, as opposed to the punishment of 
these individuals (Sorochan, 2004: 9).  However, amidst controversy, the Act was 
repealed in 1990.  This reminds us that public opinion and protest do have the potential 
for changing law.   
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 Two issues require clarification.  First, the term ‘Aboriginal’ includes many diverse groups, such as North 
American Indian, Metis, Inuit, persons who fit into more than one of these categories, as well as persons 
who do not identify themselves as Aboriginal yet are registered Indians.  Also, the category ‘North 
American Indian’ refers to many diverse populations, including Cree, Dene, Blackfoot, Mohawk, as well as 
many other groups.  Unfortunately, information specific to these different groups with regard to the PCHIP 
Act was unavailable.  As such, I have employed a rather imprecise definition of the term ‘Aboriginal.’  
Second, I must demonstrate that the confinement of this group under the PCHIP Act is indeed 
disproportionate.  As of 2006, the Aboriginal population in Alberta was 188, 365, and the total population 
was 3, 256, 360 (Statistics Canada, 2006).  This means that 17.29% of the population in Alberta was 
considered Aboriginal in 2006.  Koshan (2003) found that approximately 30% of the youth confined under 
the PCHIP Act were Aboriginal.  The disparity between these two percentages demonstrates that 
Aboriginal youth have been confined under the PCHIP Act at a rate disproportionate to their population.    
2 Harry Van Harten, Calgary lawyer who was involved in the constitutional challenge to the PCHIP Act, 
has speculated that this name change was spurned by a widening of the definition of prostitution.  As the 
child sex trade was driven off the streets, it became more difficult to apprehend and confine youth 
protitutes.  To counter decreasing numbers in the protective safe houses, it became necessary to confine 
youth who were not part of the street sex trade.  Van Harten explains:  “If you fed and sheltered me and I 
slept with you, then I was a prostitute.  That’s a stretch by any plain language analysis (and probably the 
real reason for the name change)” (Personal communication, Jan. 24, 2008, original parentheses).   
3 Kelson would not deny that politics does affect law somewhat.  However, he would argue that political 
values would have to be transformed into legal categories before entering the legal field, in contrast to 
realists, who would contend that political values directly enter the legal field, directly influencing legal 
matters (Zamboni, 2006).  Bourdieu parallels Kelson’s methodology to Saussure’s, and faults both on 
account that they ignore historical, psychological, geographic, and social considerations (Bourdieu, 1987a: 
814). 
4 This conflict between conceptions of justice stems from a conflict between formal and substantive 
rationalities.  Kalberg states “Formal rationalities have stood in the most direct antagonism to many 
substantive rationalities” (1980: 1157).  See Kalberg (1980) for information and analysis on Weber’s types 
of rationalities.  
5 See Feldman (1991) for an interpretation of Weber’s account of the causal relationship between law and 
the economy.   
6 Legal realism was also influenced by the Marxist tradition (MacDonald, 2002).   
7 For examples of research in feminist jurisprudence and criminology, see Boyd (1997), Carlen (2002), 
Cossman and Fudge (2002), Chunn and Gavigan (2004), Comack (1996), Gilligan (1982), Hannah-Moffat 
(2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004), Kline (1997), MacKinnon (1989), Martin (2002), Monture-Angus (1995), 
Phoenix (2002a and 2002b), Smart (1990), Snider (2003a and 2003b) and Valverde (1996, 1998, 1999, 
2003, 2005 and 2006).   
8 For an example, see Monture-Angus, who states “if I am the object of some form of discrimination, it is 
very difficult for me to separate what happens to me because of my gender and what happens to me 
because of my race and culture.  My world is not experienced in a linear and compartmentalized way.  I 
experience the world simultaneously as a Mohawk and as woman” (1995: 177-8, see also 2002).  See 
McClintock (1995) for an account of the intersection of gender, race and class pertaining to British 
imperialism in Africa, and Collins (1999), who applies the concept of intersectionality to gender, race, and 
scientific knowledge.  
9 For instance, the following feminist research critiques and utilize Bourdieu: Adkins and Skeggs (2004), 
Fowler (1999 and 2003), Krais (1993 and 2006), Lovell (2000), McNay (1999) and White (1998).  
10 See van Krieken (2004) and (2006) for examples of research which attempt to synthesize these two 
theorists, and see Nelken (2006) for a critique of these attempts.     
11 Valverde (2006) is critical of the “boundary-mapping exercises” in which both Bourdieu and Luhmann 
engage.  She asks, “Is the question of the place, location, and borders of ‘law’ necessarily the most useful 
and important one that can be asked?” (2006: 591-2). 
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12 Bourdieu himself has commented on this similarity, stating “one could easily retranslate the concepts of 
‘self-referentiality’ […] by what I put under the notion of autonomy” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 103).   
13 Bourdieu has argued that Luhmann’s work has presented formalist theory under a new name (systems 
theory) (Bourdieu, 1987a: 816).  
2 For an example of the permeability of boundaries between fields, see Wacquant, who argues that the 
ghetto and the prison have increasingly become more alike, forging a “deadly symbiosis” (2001: 95).  See 
also Garland, who contends that institutions of crime control and criminal justice form a network with other 
institutions including the legal and welfare systems and the labour market (2001: 5).  
15 Bourdieu notes that the juridical field is less autonomous than other fields, such as the artistic, literary, or 
scientific fields.  This is due to the juridical field’s “determinant role it plays in social reproduction” 
(1987a: 850).  
16 The concept of habitus did not originate with Bourdieu; he identifies habitus as an “old Aristotelian and 
Thomist concept that [he] completely rethought” (Bourdieu, 1990b: 10).   
17 Economic capital is defined as that which is “immediately and directly convertible into money” 
(Bourdieu, 1986: 243).  Social capital is the manifestation of powerful social networks in which an 
individual is embedded; it is based on resources arising from “connections or group membership,” and is 
strongly correlated with symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1987b: 3-4).  Cultural capital, or ‘informational 
capital,’ has three subtypes: embodied, objectified, and institutionalized (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
119).  Educational credentials are a form of embodied cultural capital (Calhoun, 1993: 70).   
18 Bourdieu explains: “the particular ‘power’ of economic capital could spring from the fact that it permits 
an economy of economic calculation, an economy of economy, that it is, of rational management, of the 
labour of preservation and transmission – that it is, in other terms, easier to manage rationally (this can be 
seen in the case of its realization, money), and to predict (which means it goes hand in glove with 
calculation and with mathematical science)” (Bourdieu, 1990b: 93).   
19 See Wood (2005) for an account of symbolic violence within the context of crime policies which are 
named for particular victims of crime, for example, Megan’s Law in the United States.   
20 In England, the principle of doli capax, or, the capacity of doing ill, mediated punishments given to 
youth.  Children under the age of seven were presumed incapable of criminal intent, and youth between 
seven and fourteen were also presumed innocent unless they possessed the capacity to distinguish between 
good and evil.  Youth over fourteen were considered fully responsible (May, 2002: 99). 
21 The Juvenile Offenders Act was passed in 1847 (see Shore, 2002: 159), which was followed by the 
Reformatory Schools (Youthful Offenders) Act in 1854 and the Reformatory Schools Act in 1857 (see 
Rush, 2002: 139), 1861, and 1866 (see Hendrick, 2002: 23).   
22 For an account of the child-saving movement in the United States, see Platt (1969). 
23 This assumption continues today.  See Schissel (2006: 87-90) for an account of public panic over girls’ 
criminality.   
24 The policy of assimilation of Aboriginal peoples through education was not abandoned by the federal 
government until 1973 (Monture-Angus, 1995: 93).  However, a ‘missionary’ approach to the education of 
Aboriginal students still exists today (Monture-Angus, 1995: 96-121). 
25 According to Foucault, these similarities across institutions are evidence of the emergence of 
‘disciplinary society.’  He remarks, “Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, 
hospitals, which all resemble prisons?” (1995: 228).  
26 “White slavery’ fears had long existed in Britain before this law was passed in 1885.  In the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, it was commonly believed that innocent young English girls were being abducted 
and forced into brothels, located in England and beyond.  Canadian politicians were less convinced that 
such an international trade existed, but the concern over ‘white slavery’ did hold some weight nonetheless, 
notably among the national temperance movement, women’s rights groups, and church organizations.  
Contrary to the Canada, the concern over ‘white slavery’ in the United States was substantial, and 
culminated in the White Slave Traffic Act in 1910 (see McLaren, 1986, Wahab, 2002 and Hunt, 2002).       
27 William L. Scott, a founding member of the Ottawa Children’s Aid Society, attended a conference in 
1906 in Philadelphia.  At the conference, he became interested in setting up a juvenile court and probation 
system, as these were being developed in the United States (Trepanier, 1999).  Shortly after the conference, 
Scott prepared a draft bill which borrowed from legislation which had been passed in Illinois and Colorado 
(Trepanier, 1999).   
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28 In England, any child found begging, or interacting with thieves and/or prostitutes, or whose parents 
were deemed inappropriate, could be sent to an industrial school or reformatory (Clarke, 2002: 131).  The 
conflation between neglected children and delinquent children was further solidified in 1927, when a Home 
Office Departmental Committee on the Treatment of Young Offenders argued that there was little 
difference between the neglected and delinquent child.  Whether the child was brought before the court 
because of wandering, or because he had committed a crime was a ‘mere accident.’ (Clarke, 2002: 131).   
29 Simultaneous to this trend was the decline of eugenic and hereditary theories of delinquency.  See 
Boritch (1997) for a brief account of the eugenics movement and prostitution in Canada.   
30 This close relationship between law and psychiatry continues today.  See Luther and Mela (2006).   
31 Section 88 authorized the application of provincial laws (including those related to Child welfare) to 
Indians, including those living on reserve (Hogg, 2005: 615).  There are five exceptions to this rule, which 
are ‘singling out,’ ‘Indianness,’ ‘paramountcy,’ ‘Natural Resources Agreements,’ and ‘section 35.’  See 
Hogg (2005: 609-15) for details on these exceptions.   
32 It is important to note that Aboriginal groups resisted to the removal of children from their families.  For 
instance, the Spallumcheen Indian Band in British Columbia took control of child welfare services on their 
territory after seventy-five out of approximately one hundred fifty-five children were removed from their 
community between 1962 and 1966 (Walmsley, 2005: 24, see also Monture, 1989: 9).  Full control over 
child welfare matters were obtained in 1981.      
33 While this renaming of youth prostitution as sexual abuse may appear enlightened, Phoenix (2002a) 
points out that “the social and material uniqueness of being a young person involved in prostitution is 
obscured in favour of a construction of them as victims of child abuse” (Phoenix, 2002a: 364). 
34 This recommendation was immediately challenged by the 1985 Fraser Report.  Based on an analysis of 
existing research, Fraser and his colleagues argued that criminalization would be unlikely to help youth 
prostitutes (Bagley, 1991: 123, see also Bittle, 2002a: 7) 
35 Sonja Grover is an associate professor in the Faculty of Education at Lakehead University in Thunder 
Bay, Ontario, Canada.  She has published extensively in the area of children’s rights and the children’s 
liberation movement.  See http://groverbooks.net/Publication%20List.htm for her publication list. 
36 Specific authors are not identified in the document.   
37 The ‘time-out’ room is a tiny room which locks from the outside.  A small one-way window allows the 
staff to observe the youth, without allowing the youth to see the staff.  Youth were held in the time-out 
room if they were judged by staff to be in danger of hurting themselves or others (this proved to be a very 
vague condition, as youth who were simply upset or displaying disruptive behaviour were regularly 
confined in the time-out room).   
38 Contributors include Karen Busby, Dr. Pamela Downe, Kelly Gorkoff, Kendra Nixon, Dr. Leslie Tutty, 
and Dr. E. Jane Ursel.  The 2002 publication was phase two of a larger report titled, “Violence Prevention 
and the Girl Child.”  This initiative started in March 1998, when the Alliance of Five Research Centres on 
Violence (AFRCV) received a grant from Status of Women Canada (SWC) to undertake research to 
develop a national action plan on violence prevention for female children (The Alliance of Five Research 
Centres on Violence, 1999: 3). 
39 A few interviewees stated that secure treatment facilities were helpful.  One women stated that these 
facilities assisted in ‘scaring them straight’ (Busby et al., 2002: 7-8).   
40 This non-profit organization “promotes freedom from violence, social justice and equality for teenage 
girls who live in poverty” (Justice For Girls, 2008).  Justice for Girls recognizes that racist child welfare 
practices and colonialism of Aboriginal communities have caused a large percentage of Aboriginal teenage 
girls to live on the streets in British Columbia (Justice For Girls, 2008).  
41 This summit occurred in Victoria, British Columbia, on March 12, 1998.  55 delegates with experience as 
sexually exploited children and youth presented the Declaration to participating governments, international 
non-governmental organizations and delegates without histories of sexual exploitation (International Centre 
to Combat Exploitation of Children, 1998).  
42 Section 151 punishes: Every person who, for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with a part 
of the body or with an object, any part of the body of a person under the age of fourteen years (Criminal 
Code, Section 151).   
43 Invitation to sexual touching is described by Section 152 as: Every person who, for a sexual purpose, 
invites, counsels or incites a person under the age of fourteen years to touch, directly or indirectly, with a 
part of the body or with an object, the body of any person, including the body of the person who so invites, 
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counsels or incites and the body of the person under the age of fourteen years (Criminal Code, Section 
152).   
44 Section 153 is as follows: 1) Every person commits an offence who is in a position of trust or authority 
towards a young person, who is a person with whom the young person is in a relationship of dependency or 
who is in a relationship with a young person that is exploitative of the young person, and who  
(a) for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, any part of 
the body of the young person; or 
(b) for a sexual purpose, invites, counsels or incites a young person to touch, directly or indirectly, with a 
part of the body or with an object, the body of any person, including the body of the person who so invites, 
counsels or incites and the body of the young person (Criminal Code, Section 153).  
45 Section 170 makes liable: Every parent or guardian of a person under the age of eighteen years who 
procures the person for the purpose of engaging in any sexual activity prohibited by this Act with a person 
other than the parent or guardian (Criminal Code, Section 170).   
46 Whether these laws are used appropriately or effectively is another issue entirely.  I am simply pointing 
out that legislation pertinent to youth prostitution already existed before PCHIP was passed.  Clearly, the 
existence of youth prostitution prior to the passing of PCHIP was not due to a lack of legislation.   
47 This discrepancy in punishments between male and female participants in prostitution has a long history 
in Canada.  Female prostitutes have been targeted by discriminatory legislation and unequal law 
enforcement since the earliest laws surrounding prostitution (see Bittle, 2002b: 324 and Koshan 2003).   
48 This was pointed out during legislative debates by MLA Dianne Martin (see Koshan 2003) and by Harry 
Van Harten, a Calgary lawyer who participated in the constitutional challenge to PCHIP (See Chapter 5).  
According to Van Harten, discussions with the Alberta Government prior to the passing of PCHIP 
regarding this overlap in provisions “fell on deaf ears” (personal communication, Jan 23, 2008).  Van 
Harten points out, “when you put sex and children on the front page, politicians can’t be seen [to] be non-
supportive of a remedy” (personal communication, Jan 23, 2008).  Anecdotally, I can attest that a fair 
amount of client transference occurred between the protective safehouse and the secure unit.  Many of the 
female residents of the protective safehouse had been periodically incarcerated at the secure unit as well.  
Indeed, both classifications of youth received the same sort of ‘treatment’ anyway, regardless of the 
legislation under which they were confined.   
49 For an account of the historical development of the juridical field, see Bourdieu et al. (1994).   
50 Ultra Vires is a Latin phrase that literally means “beyond the power.”  It is “unauthorized; beyond the 
scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004: 1558).   
51 Section 7 is as follows: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not 
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice” (Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, 1982: Section 7).     
52 Section 8 is as follows: “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure” 
(Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982: Section 8).    
53 Section 9 is as follows: “Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned” (Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982: Section 9).   
54 Section  10(b) is as follows: “Everyone has the right on arrest or detention b) to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay and to be informed of that right” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982: 
Section 10(b)).   
55 Section 10(c) is as follows: “Everyone has the right on arrest or detention (c) to have the validity of the 
detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released of the detention is not lawful” (Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982: Section 10(c)).  
56 Harry Van Harten, counsel for the youth, has commented on this comparison.  He states, “[The PCHIP 
Act] involved the physical liberty of children and was, therefore, a completely different situation” (personal 
communication, Jan 23, 2008).   
57 Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is as follows: “(1) Every individual is equal before and 
under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination 
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age 
or mental or physical disability.  (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has 
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are 
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982: Section 15 (1) and (2)).   
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58 In Law v. Canada, a 30-year old woman was denied survivor’s benefits under the Canadian Pension Plan.  
She appealed to the Minister of National Health and Welfare and then to the Pension Plan Review Tribunal, 
arguing that she was being discriminated against on the basis of her age (Law v Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration) 1999).  Her appeal was dismissed, but it resulted in a set of guidelines 
applicable to equality rights claims pertaining to Section 15 of the Charter.   
59 Stages Two and Three of the Law test are ‘Enumerated/Analogous Grounds’ and ‘Discrimination’ 
respectively (Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 1999).  See Koshan (2003) for an 
analysis of these stages vis-à-vis the PCHIP Act.   
60 Section 33 (1) and (2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is as follows: “33 (1) Parliament or the 
legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case 
may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 
or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.  (2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration 
made under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision of this 
Charter referred to in the declaration” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982: Section 33 (1) 
and (2).  In other words, if a province passes legislation that will discriminate against someone, the 
province can avoid a constitutional challenge by stating that the legislation is exempt from Section 15 
(Monture-Angus, 1995: 144).   
61 During a recent sexual assault case in Calgary, Judge Rooke made several misogynist comments, calling 
the female victim “naïve” and “stupid,” and stating that “it’s the stupid people who need protection” (The 
Curvature: a feminist perspective on politics and culture, Dec 13, 2007).  One wonders if he has a similar 
opinion of youth ‘protected’ under the PCHIP Act.   
62 Furthermore, Bakan argues that Charter adjudication is political because it requires judges to decide how 
power should be exercised (1997: 143). 
63 The overrepresentation of Aboriginal youth in protective safe houses is consistent with the 
overrepresentation of Aboriginal youth in custody.  Latimer and Foss (2004) found that in Alberta, 36% of 
youth in custody were Aboriginal, compared to 64% non-Aboriginal.  Compared to other provinces, the 
rate of incarceration in Alberta was low.  In Saskatchewan, for instance, fully 88% of youth in custody 
were Aboriginal at the time of the study (Latimer and Foss, 2004).   
64 I do not contend that the habitus is totally racist and sexist.  The habitus is composed of elements beyond 
assumptions regarding race and sex.  
65 Commenting on the article that preceded the book, Fowler states “Bourdieu has helped to bring questions 
of women’s subjectivity from the margins into the center, while strengthening his own theory of practice in 
the process” (1999: 478).  However, other feminists have not been as accepting of Bourdieu’s book.  Some 
sociologists argued that the “living conditions, practices, views, and struggles of women today are not 
reflected at all in Bourdieu’s text, which instead paints the picture of a gender order so completely doxic  
and closed that it seems almost totalitarian” (Krais, 2006: 122).  The central critique of the book was that 
Bourdieu had produced a work which was itself a document of masculine domination (Krais, 2006).  
66 Reflecting on his work in Algeria, Bourdieu rejects classifications such as ‘orientalism,’ and ‘ethnology.’  
He points out that his work in this period ‘de-exoticed’ the exotic.  He also emphasizes the implications of 
his work among the Kabyles which forces the European researchers to discover in themselves and their 
societies the same “cognitive-practical principles of the masculine view of the world” (Bourdieu, 2008: 23).  
He outlines the methodological principles under which research on the ‘other’ should be undertaken: “It is 
possible and legitimate to speak of others only at the price of double historization, of both the object and 
the subject of knowledge.  This means that the scientist must put himself in the frame in order to exclude 
the frame, he has to work to know himself to be in a position to know the other; all progress in knowledge 
of the object is a progress in knowledge of the subject of knowledge and vice versa” (Bourdieu, 2008: 23-4, 
emphasis added).    
67 The emergent field of ‘victim policy’ has been noted by Garland (2001: 121).  
68 Kingsley and Mark (2000) define ‘experiential youth’ as “any youth who are, or have been, involved in 
commercial sexual exploitation” (3).  They declare that the term ‘child or youth prostitute’ cannot be used, 
as these youth are sexually exploited and reference to them must reflect this fact (2000: 77).  I have not 
used the term ‘experiential youth’ as I believe it to be vague and euphemistic.  Further, the use of such 
terms, which reflect the recent renaming of these youth as abuse victims and not offenders, has led to the 
justification of the incarceration of these youth.  This is an unexpected outcome of this renaming – 
Kingsley and Mark declare that laws must protect sexually exploited children and youth, as opposed to 
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punishing them like criminals (2000: 77), which is the opposite of what the PCHIP Act does.  My use of 
the term ‘youth prostitute’ is consistent with other articles, including Bittle (2002a) and (2002b), Busby et 
al. (2002) and Koshan (2003).    
69 Pamela George was an Aboriginal woman who was murdered near Regina, Saskatchewan on April 17, 
1995.  On the evening of the murder, she was working as a prostitute and was picked up by two white men 
who killed her.  The men were sentenced to six and a half years, as twenty months had already been served 
prior to the sentencing.   
70 This phrase belongs to Martin (2002).  
71 The PCHAD Act allows parents or guardians of drug-addicted youth to have their child confined for up 
to five days in a protective safe house for detoxification (Protection of Children Abusing Drugs Act, 
Alberta Government). 
72 The DECA, proclaimed in force on November 1, 2006, allows for the apprehension of youth (under the 
age of 18) who are exposed to drug manufacturing or trafficking via their guardians (Drug-Endangered 
Children Act, Alberta Government).  Apprehended children can be held for a maximum of two days.  As 
such children would also fall under the jurisdiction of the Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, the 
need for such legislation is unclear (See Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, Sections 2 and 3).   
73 See Filler (2001) for an analysis of reactionary rhetoric which legitimized the passing of Megan’s Law in 
the United States during the mid 1990s.   
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